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ABSTRACT
This paper is based on a presentation made at the New York Stock Exchange Conference
on the Future of Global Equity Trading, March 12, 2004, Sarasota, FL.
Looking back, was it a momentary enthusiasm? The dramatic increase in cross-listed
securities, particularly in the United States, was one of the remarkable phenomena of the
1990s capital markets. The bonding, or corporate governance, hypothesis was one of the
more intriguing theories to surface to explain the phenomenon. Cross-listing, the
hypothesis suggested, might be a bonding mechanism by which firms, incorporated in a
jurisdiction with “weak protection” of minority shareholder rights or poor enforcement
mechanisms, could voluntarily subject themselves to higher disclosure standards and
stricter enforcement of the US markets in order to attract investors. By focusing on
shareholder protection as key to cross-listing, the bonding hypothesis became
inextricably linked to an important and influential body of academic work, the “law and
finance” literature.
As intriguing as the bonding hypothesis is, this article argues that it offers only a partial
explanation for the cross-listing phenomenon in the United States in the 1990s. Largely
overlooked has been the main motor driving the exponential growth of cross-listings on
the NYSE and NASDAQ in the 1990s: Canadian-based interlisted corporations (CBIs).
CBIs form the largest single group of interlisted foreign corporations in the United
States, by a huge margin, representing over 25% all interlistings on the NYSE, NMSNASDAQ and AMEX in 2004. In fact, Canadian issuers form the largest single group of
foreign private issuers (FPIs) in the United States, period. In 2004, there were nearly
five times as many Canadian FPIs as the next largest national group, United Kingdom
issuers.
The bonding hypothesis does not explain CBIs easily. CBIs do not come from a “weak
investor protection” jurisdiction and, for a variety of reasons and in a number of ways,
tend not to “signal” their entry into the US market. Rather than “bonding”, CBIs have
been adroitly exploiting what financial economists have described as the “home bias” of
U.S portfolio investors. CBIs have been, at least until very recently, chameleons,
deliberately blending into the woodwork of the US markets.
This article will look at what makes CBIs different from most other interlisted companies
and why the bonding hypothesis may not be explanatory of their behavior. In doing so,
the article questions some of the underlying assumptions of the law and finance literature
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which supports the bonding hypothesis. Finally, the article considers implications of the
CBI experience which may merit further consideration going forward.
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I. Introduction
Looking back, was it a momentary enthusiasm? 1 The dramatic increase in cross-listed
securities, particularly in the United States, was one of the remarkable phenomena of the
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In the post-Sarbanes-Oxley environment, delisting by non-U.S. issuers from U.S. exchanges has become a
prominent issue of the day. Between 1990 and 1999, 10 foreign firms deregistered with the U.S. SEC,
whereas between 2000 to 2005, 110 firms deregistered. See Andras Marosi & Nadia Ziad Massoud, “You
Can Enter but You Cannot Leave...” – U.S. Securities Markets and Foreign Firms, Table 1, available at
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=882152, (February 2006). According to the Wall Street Journal, $9 out of
every $10 raised by foreign companies through new stock offerings in 2000 was done in New York rather
than London or Luxembourg. “By 2005, the reverse was true: Nine of every 10 dollars was raised through
new company listings in London or Luxembourg, the biggest spread favoring London since 1990.” See
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1990s capital markets. In the ten year period from 1990 to 2000, the number of foreign
corporations listed on the two main U.S. exchanges increased 450%.2 In the same ten
year period, American Depositary Receipt programs increased over 500%.3 Listing and
trading in the United States by non-U.S. issuers is often by way of American Depositary
Receipts, or “ADRs”, a form of derivative security.4 Leading the charge, it appeared,
were Latin American issuers.5

New York Loses Edge in Snagging Foreign Listings, WALL ST. J., Thursday, January 26, 2006, at C1. The
pressure, primarily from European issuers already listed in the United States, to permit non-U.S.
corporations to delist and terminate their reporting obligations with the U.S. SEC, has been so intense as to
prompt a proposed rule change by the SEC. Currently deregistration of a non-U.S. issuer is permitted only
if it has fewer than 300 U.S. shareholders under rules adopted in 1964 and last amended in 1983. Under the
proposed rule, a non-U.S. company that is listed in its home country would be able to terminate the SEC
registration of its shares if it has been registered for two years, has filed all required SEC reports, has not
offered its securities in the U.S. market for a year (including in a Rule 144A transaction or other private
placement) and meets one of two quantitative tests: (i) 5% or less of its public float is held by U.S.
residents; or (ii) if a well known seasoned issuer, 10% of its public float is held by U.S. residents provided
that 5% or less of worldwide trading volume ins in the Untied States. See Termination of a Foreign Private
Issuer’s Registration of a Class of Securities under Section 12(g) and Duty to File Reports under Section
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Release No. 34-53020; International Series Release No.
1295; File No. S7-12-05, at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-53020.pdf (February 28, 2006).
2
See JOHN C. COFFEE, COMPETITION AMONG SECURITIES MARKETS: A PATH DEPENDENT PERSPECTIVE, at
18 (Colum. L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 192, 2002).
3
Id. at 17. STIJN CLAESSENS ET AL., STOCK MARKETS IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES, at 17 (World Bank
Financial Sector Discussion Paper No. 5, Sep. 2000).
4
“ADRs were developed by JP Morgan in 1927 as a vehicle for investors to register and earn dividends on
non-U.S. stock without direct access to the overseas market itself. U.S. depositary banks hold …overseas
securities in custody in the country of origin and convert all dividends and other payments into U.S. dollars
to receipt holders in the United States. Investors, therefore, bear all currency risk and indirectly pay fees to
the depositary bank. Each depositary receipt denotes shares that represent a specific number of underlying
shares in the home market, and new receipts can be created by the bank for investors when the requisite
number of shares are [sic] deposited in their custodial account in the home market. Cancellations or
redemptions of ADRs simply reverse the process.” See Stephen R. Foerster & G. Andrew Karolyi, The
Effects of Market Segmentation and Investor Recognition on Asset Prices: Evidence from Foreign Stocks
Listing in the United States, 54 J. FIN. 981, 983 (1999).
4
“ADRs were developed by JP Morgan in 1927 as a vehicle for investors to register and earn dividends on
no-U.S. stock without direct access to the overseas market itself. U.S. depositary banks hold that overseas
securities in custody in the country of origin and convert all dividends and other payments into U.S. dollars
to receipt holders in the United States. Investors, therefore, bear all currency risk and indirectly pay fees to
the depositary bank. Each depositary receipt denotes shares that represent a specific number of underlying
shares in the home market, and new receipts can be created by the bank for investors when the requisite
number of shares are deposited in their custodial account in the home market. Cancellations or redemptions
of ADRs simply reverse the process.” See Stephen R. Foerster & G. Andrew Karolyi, The Effects of Market
Segmentation and investor Recognition on Asset Prices: Evidence from Foreign Stocks Listing in the
United States, 54 J. FIN. 981, 983 (1999).
5
See Coffee, supra note 2, at 17.
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The cross-listing phenomenon attracted a considerable amount of academic scrutiny,
primarily among financial economists.6 The endeavor was to determine the motivations
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Forrester & Karolyi, supra note 4; Carol A. Frost, Elizabeth Gordon, & Andrew Hayes, Stock Exchange
Disclosure and Market Development: An Analysis of 50 International Exchanges, J. ACCT. RES. (June,
2006). Jordan Siegel, Can Foreign Firms Bond Themselves Effectively by Renting U.S. Securities Laws?,
75 J. FIN. ECON. 319 (2005); Magnus Dahlquist, Lee Pinkowitz, Rene M. Stulz & Rohan Williamson,
Corporate Governance and the Home Bias, 38 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 87 (2003); Nuno G.
Fernandes & Miguel A. Ferreira, Does International Cross-listing Really Improve the Information
Environment?, EFA 2005 Moscow Meetings, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=676653 (January
2006); Craig Doidge, Andrew Karolyi & Rene M. Stulz, Why are foreign firms listed in the U.S. worth
more?, Nat’l Bureau Econ. Res. at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8538.pdf; Shmuel Baruch, Andrew
Karolyi & Michael Lemmon, Multi-Market Trading and Liqudity: Theory and Evidence at
http://home.business.utah.edu/finsb/BaruchKarolyiLemmon%20_June%201_2005.pdf; KATHERINE SMITH
& GEORGE SOFIANOS, THE IMPACT OF AN NYSE LISTING ON THE GLOBAL TRADING OF NON-U.S. STOCKS,
(NYSE Working Paper 97-02, June 1997), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/wp97-02.pdf; SERGI
SARKISSIAN & MICHAEL SCHILL, ARE THERE PERMANENT VALUATION GAINS TO OVERSEAS LISTING?
EVIDENCE FROM MARKET SEQUENCING AND SELECTION, (Working Paper July 26, 2005), available at
http://neumann.hec.ca/cref/sem/documents/051007.pdf (an older copy is EFA 2004 Maastricht Meetings
Paper No. 4491, Darden School of Business, Working Paper No. 03-03, July 25, 2003, available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=395140); CRAIG ANDREW DOIDGE, GEORGE ANDREW KAROLYI, KARL V.LINS,
DARIUS P. MILLER & RENÉ M. STULZ, PRIVATE BENEFITS OF CONTROL, OWNERSHIP, AND THE CROSSLISTING DECISION, (NBER Working Paper No. W11162 March 2005), available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=679321; Pamela Moulton & Li Wei, A Tale of Two Time Zones: Cross-Listed
Stock Liquidity and the Availability of Substitutes (September 19, 2005), available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=807704; LUZI HAIL & CHRISTIAN LEUZ, COST OF CAPITAL AND CASH FLOW
EFFECTS OF U.S. CROSS-LISTINGS, (UPenn Wharton, Working Paper), available at
http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/weiss/conf_papers/HL%20ADRs%20Apr05.pdf;
WARREN B. BAILEY, GEORGE ANDREW KAROLYI & CAROLINA SALVA, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF
INCREASED DISCLOSURE: EVIDENCE FROM INTERNATIONAL CROSS-LISTINGS, (Dice Center, Working Paper
No. 2002-4; AFA 2003 Washington, DC Meetings, February 2005), available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=304560; Kent Baker, Jon Nofsinger & Daniel Weaver, International Cross-listing
and Visibility, J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 37, at 495, (2002); Rene Stulz, Why are foreign firms
listed in the U.S. worth more?, 71(2)J. FIN. ECON., at 205 (2004); Vihang Errunza & Darius Miller, Market
segmentation and the cost of capital in international equity markets, 35(4) J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS, at 577 (2000); Andrew Karolyi, Why do companies list shares abroad? A survey of the evidence
and its managerial implications, vol. 7 Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments, Blackwell: Boston,
1998; MICHAEL KING & DAN SEGAL, INTERNATIONAL CROSS LISTING AND THE BONDING HYPOTHESIS,
(Bank of Canada, Working Paper No. 2004-17, May 2004), available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=555953.; Dong Wook Lee, Why Does Shareholder Wealth Increase When NonU.S. Firms Announce Their Listing in the U.S.? (August 2004), available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=422960; Christian Leuz, Discussion of ADRs, Analysts, and accuracy: Does
Cross-lisitng in the Untied States improve a firm’s information environment and increase market value?,
41 J. ACCT. RES. 347 (2003); Darius Miller, The market reaction to international cross-listings: Evidence
form depositary receipts, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 103 (1999); William Reese & Michael Weisbach, Protection of
minority shareholder interests , cross-listings in the United States, and subsequent equity offerings, 66 J.
Fin. Econ. 65 (2002); SERGEI SARKISSIAN & MICHAEL J. SCHILL, ARE THERE PERMANENT VALUATION
GAINS TO OVERSEAS LISTINGS? EVIDENCE FROM MARKET SEQUENCING AND SELECTION, (Darden School of
Business, Working Paper No. 03-03; EFA 2004 Maastricht Meetings Paper No. 4491, July 25, 2003),
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=395140.
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and significance of the marked surge in cross-listings. Why was there this sudden
interest by non-US firms in listing in the United States? What was the significance for
the U.S. markets? The home markets? International markets?

A number of explanations for the cross-listing phenomenon were posited, the most
traditional of which is sometimes referred to as the “market segmentation” theory; by
cross-listing, issuers increase liquidity and deepen the pool for their securities, leading to
increased share valuations, both abroad and at home.7 Other hypotheses linked product
market expansion with the cross-listing of securities by a manufacturer or service
provider. 8 Simple geographic proximity was also suggested as a reason 9 Sarkissian
and Schill, in examining all cross-listed companies on the major world exchanges, found
“strong evidence that cross-listing clusters regionally.”11 Although they were unable to
discriminate among the underlying causes of their results, geographic, cultural, economic,
and industrial proximity were all supported by their findings.12 Coffee has, in retrospect,
suggested that the rise in interest of cross-listings on NASDAQ during the 1990s might
have been merely a side-effect of the technology bubble.13 A more prosaic explanation
of the exponential rise in foreign listings on the New York Stock Exchange during the
same period might be the persuasive marketing efforts of the Exchange itself, which
7

See DP Miller, The Market Reaction to International Cross-listings: Evidence from Depository Receipts,
51 J. FIN. ECON. 103 (1999); see Stephen R. Foerster & G. Andrew Karolyi, The Effects of Market
Segmentation and Investor Recognition on Asset Prices: Evidence from Foreign Stocks Listing in the
United States, J. FIN. 54 (3), 981-1013 (1999).
8
Foerster & Karolyi also found support for such a theory, id. at 4.
9
Sergei Sarkissian & Michael J. Schill, The Overseas Listing Decision: New Evidence of Proximity and
Preference, 17(3) THE REVIEW OF FIN. STUDIES 769 (2004).
10
See, e.g., LINDA L. TESAR & INGRID M. WERNER, HOME BIAS AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF SECURITIES
MARKETS (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper no. 4218, 1992).
11
Sarkissian & Schill, supra note 9, at 3.
12
Id. at 54.
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together with accommodations provided to non-US issuers to the listing rules (discussed
infra) made cross-listing a more attractive proposition. 14

Among the copious literature on the cross-listing phenomenon, the bonding hypothesis
was one of the more intriguing theories to surface.15 “A newer interpretation is today
emerging that cross-listing may also be a bonding mechanism by which firms
incorporated in a jurisdiction with weak protection of minority rights or poor enforcement
mechanisms can voluntarily subject themselves to higher disclosure standards and stricter
enforcement in order to attract investors who would otherwise be reluctant to invest (or

13

See Coffee, supra note 2, at 54.
In the late 1980s, the New York Stock Exchange set about identifying non-U.S. issuers, particularly
Canadian issuers, which would meet its listing criteria in an effort to promote new listings. Conversation
with Robert G. Britz, New York Stock Exchange, New York, NY (1989). Recognizing the functional
equivalence of foreign corporate governance mechanisms, The New York Stock Exchange has provided
regulatory accommodations for non-U.S. issuers which continue to this day. The relevant rules are to be
found in s. 303A of the NYSE Listed Company Manual. Foreign private issuers, as defined by rule 3b-4
under the Exchange Act, are permitted to follow home country practice instead of the provisions listed in
303A with the following exceptions: such companies are required to comply with the requirements of
s.303A.06 (must have an audit committee that satisfies the requirements of 10A-3 of the Exchange Act),
303A.11 (must disclose any significant ways that their corporate governance practices differ from those
required by domestic companies under NYSE listing standards), 303A.12(b) (the CEO must promptly
notify the NYSE in writing after any executive officer becomes aware of any material non-compliance with
the applicable provisions of 303A), and 303A.12(c) (must submit an executed written affirmation annually
to the NYSE, and an interim affirmation whenever a change occurs to the board or any committees subject
to 303A). Additionally, in 1994 a longstanding debate over “one share/one vote” was resolved by SEC
Rule 19c-4 which required stock exchange rules to preclude domestic listed issuers from creating disparate
voting structures. However, the rule did not preclude initial public offerings of dual class shares nor the
initial listing of companies with existing dual class shares listed elsewhere. “Most other jurisdictions
around the world seem to have few restrictions on issuing dual-class stock.” Second Class Investors – The
use and abuse of subordinated shares in Canada, Shareholder Association for Research and Education,
Vancouver, Canada, April 2004, at 10; See ALSO ANETE PAJUSTE, DETERMINANTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF
THE UNIFICATION OF DUAL-CLASS SHARES, (European Central Bank, Working Paper Series No. 465, March
2005), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract_id 683158 and http://www.ecb.int. The dual class share
structure is now making its appearance in U.S. domestic listed companies; Google is a prime example.
15
See Coffee, supra note 2; Coffee, The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in
Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 NW. U.L. REV. 641 (1999). See also Rene Stultz,
Globalization, Corporate Finance and the Cost of Capital, 12 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 9 (1999); OWEN
FUERST, A GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF THE INVESTOR PROTECTION REGULATIONS ARGUMENT FOR
GLOBAL LISTING OF STOCKS (Working Paper, 1998); MICHAEL R. KING & DAN SEGAL, INTERNATIONAL
CROSS-LISTING AND THE BONDING HYPOTHESIS (Bank of Canada Working Paper No. 2004-17, May 2004).
14
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who would discount such stocks to reflect the risk of minority expropriation)”.16

The

bonding, or corporate governance, hypothesis for cross-listing was “consistent with a new
academic literature that argues that liquid and deep securities markets can develop only in
jurisdictions that protect the rights and expectations of minority shareholders”.17

As the bonding hypothesis was picked up and examined, it came to stand for the
proposition that the “principal motivation for cross-listing is investor protection.”18 Firms
“from countries with poor protection of minority shareholders signal their desire to
respect rights of shareholders by listing in a jurisdiction with higher scrutiny, tougher
regulation and better enforcement.”19 And so, the bonding hypothesis became
inextricably linked to an important and influential body of academic literature often
referred to as the “law and finance” literature.20
As intriguing as the bonding hypothesis is, this article argues that it offers only a partial
explanation for the cross-listing phenomenon in the United States in the 1990s. Largely
overlooked was the main motor driving the exponential growth of cross-listings on the
16

See Coffee, supra note 2, at 11. “Bonding” is a term of art in modern institutional law and economics. It
refers to the costs or liabilities that an agent or entrepreneur will incur to assure investors that it will
perform as promised, thereby enabling it to market its securities at a higher price. The paradigmatic
example would be the surety bond purchased by the agent and protecting its shareholder principals. The
term was coined in Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); See Coffee, supra note 2, at fn. 22.
17
See Coffee, supra note 2, at 4-5. “The seminal work of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny
(“LLS&V”) has established the existence of two rival structures of share ownership – dispersed ownership
and concentrated ownership, and that the structure of share ownership in a given jurisdiction correlates with
significant differences in the legal protection provided to minority shareholders.” See also Coffee, supra
note 2, at fn. 10.
18
See King & Segal, infra note 21, at 1.
19
Id. An interesting analogy, brought to the author’s attention by Professor Thomas Cotter, is to the U.S.
patent system. Clarisa Long has written about patents as signals; companies want to convey credible
private information about their value by registering a patent in the United States. See Patent Signals, 69(2)
U. CHI. L. REV. 625 (2002).
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NYSE and NASDAQ in the 1990s: Canadian-based interlisted corporations (CBIs, in the
jargon of the Toronto Stock Exchange).21 The bonding hypothesis does not explain
CBIs easily. Rather than “bonding”, CBIs have been adroitly exploiting what financial
economists have described as the “home bias” of U.S portfolio investors.

This article will look at what makes CBIs different from most other interlisted companies
and why the bonding hypothesis may not be explanatory of their behavior. In doing so,
the article questions some of the underlying assumptions of the law and finance literature
which supports the bonding hypothesis. Finally, the article considers implications of the
CBI experience which may merit further consideration going forward.

II. Beyond the Bonding Hypothesis

CBIs form the largest single group of interlisted foreign corporations in the United States,
by a huge margin: 189 corporations at the end of 2004 representing over 25% of all
interlistings on the NYSE, NMS-NASDAQ and AMEX. 22

In fact, Canadian issuers

form the largest single group of foreign private issuers (FPIs)23 in the United States,
See Coffee, supra note 2; see also La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, Law and Finance,
156(2) INT’L. LIBRARY OF CRITICAL WRITINGS IN ECON. 435 (2003).
21
This paper, in fact, originated as a commentary to one of the few academic articles to look specifically at
CBIs. MICHAEL R. KING & DAN SEGAL, INTERNATIONAL CROSS-LISTING AND THE BONDING HYPOTHESIS,
(Bank of Canada, Working Paper No. 2004-17, May 2004), available at SSRN,
http://ssrn.com/abstract=555953; See Sarkassian, supra note 6; see Usha R. Mittoo, infra note 27.
22
NYSE 18.6%; AMEX 86.6% ; NMS NASDAQ 22.4%. For the Nasdaq Stock Market –Small Cap
Market and Over-the-Counter market, the percentages represented by Canadian FPIs are even more
striking: 48.9% and 63.6%, respectively. Foreign Companies registered and reporting with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC, Office of International Corporate Finance (December 31,
2004).
23
"Foreign private issuer" (“FPI”) is defined in Rule 3b-4 under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240. 3b-4) and
Rule 405 under the Securities Act (17 CFR 230. 405) to include all foreign issuers other than (i) foreign
governments, and (ii) foreign issuers that have more than 50 percent of their outstanding voting securities
20
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period. In 2004, there were nearly five times as many Canadian FPIs as the next largest
national group, United Kingdom issuers.24 Four hundred and ninety-seven (497)
Canadian corporations were SEC reporting issuers at the end of 2004, representing 40%
of FPIs registered and reporting in the United States.25 Over the period 1990 to 2003,
Canadian issuers accounted for 40 % of public offerings in the United States by non-U.S.
issuers.26
None of this might be surprising, given the geographic proximity of the two countries and
the increasing degree of economic integration. But in the literature examining the crosslisting phenomenon, the role of CBIs has been often overlooked. 27 There are some
reasons for this.

It is actually surprising, though, that cross-listing in the United States is such a recent
phenomenon for CBIs, given the geographic proximity to the United States (which has
not changed over the past two centuries). 28 Economic integration is not a completely
new development either. Be that as it may, between 1928 and 1976, only four Canadian

held of record by U. S. residents and that also have: U. S. citizens or residents making up a majority of their
executive officers and directors; more than 50 percent of their assets located in the United States; or their
business administered principally in the United States. See 17 CFR 240, 3b-4; 17 CFR 230.450.
24
Supra note 22. Interestingly, Israeli issuers form the third largest national group of FPIs, and, for
purposes of this paper, demonstrate the greatest similarity with Canadian issuers.
25
Id.
26
Canada represents over 40% of English common law cross-listings. See W.A. Reese, Jr. & Michael S.
Weisbach , Protection of Minority Shareholder Interests, Cross-listings in the United States, and
Subsequent Equity Offerings, 66 J. FIN. ECON. 65, at Table 2 (2002).
27
See King & Segal, supra note 21; Usha R. Mittoo, Globalization and the Value of U.S. Listing: Revisiting
Canadian Evidence, 27:9 J. BANKING & FIN. 1629; JORDAN I. SIEGEL, CAN FOREIGN FIRMS BOND
THEMSELVES EFFECTIVELY BY RENTING U.S. SECURITIES LAWS? (AFA 2003 Washington DC Meetings,
March 2004).
28
See Sarkissian & Schill, supra note 9.
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corporations listed on the NYSE .29 In the 1980s, that number doubled (nine NYSE
listings); NASDAQ saw 12 “listings” during that period 30. In the 1990s the pace of
cross-listing accelerated: there were five times as many listings by CBIs on the NYSE as
in the 1980s (forty-five) and forty-three listings on NASDAQ. In the period of 2000 to
2005, forty-five CBIs were listed on the NYSE and twenty-nine on NASDAQ.31

So, why does the bonding hypothesis not adequately explain this sudden interest by CBIs
in cross-listing in the United States? CBIs are unlike other foreign issuers for which the
bonding hypothesis has been developed. 32 The case of CBIs, however, also throws into
relief some of the assumptions which have supported, not just the bonding hypothesis,
but a wider variety of theories about the nature and behavior of non-US issuers, and in
particular, the level of protections afforded their investors.33 These assumptions merit,
and have been receiving, a closer look34, and not just as they may be applicable (or
inapplicable) to CBIs.

III. Uniquely Canadian

29

The four Canadian listings on the NYSE are: (1)Inco. Ltd. in 1928, (2)Alcan Inc. in 1950, (3)Nortel
Network Corp. in 1975, and (4)BCE Incorporation in 1976. (Data obtained from the NYSE websites.) See
infra Appendix 1.
30
At the time NASDAQ was a quotations system, not an exchange.
31
Data obtained from the NYSE and NASDAQ websites. See infra Appendix 2.
32
Israeli companies are, on the other hand, quite like CBIs. Amir Licht has documented the practices of
Israeli companies; see Licht, infra note 145.
33
These assumptions arise out of the now prolific works by Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez de Silanes,
Andrei Shleifer, & Robert Vishny. (“LLS&V”). See e.g., Rafael La Porta, et al., Law and Finance, 106 J.
POL. ECON. 1113 (1998); Rafael La Porta, et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN.
ECON. 1 (2000); Rafael La Porta, et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, 57 J. FIN. 1147
(2001).
34
See Djankov, et al, infra note 147.
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In addition to their dominating presence among non-U.S. issuers listing in the United
States, CBIs are unique in a number of other ways. CBIs have almost never used
American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) in order to enter the U.S. markets.35 There is
seamless, instantaneous, currency conversion between the Canadian and U.S. dollar;
currency conversion is one of the marketing features associated with the use of ADRs.
Canada is the dominant trading partner with the United States under the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA);36 the level of integration of trade in goods and services
is very high. Finally, and for purposes of this analysis, perhaps most importantly, CBIs,
unlike other issuers, have the benefit of regulatory choice in entering the U.S. market.37

A. ADRs and Canadian Issuers

ADRs are a form of derivative security developed by bank intermediaries based in the
United States to facilitate U.S. trading in foreign securities.38 Canadian issuers have
virtually never used ADRs as a trading or listing vehicle. Difficulties associated with
clearing and settlement procedures and currency conversion, both major factors originally
justifying the expense and additional complexity of ADRs, were not compelling in the
case of Canadian securities. In addition, the long familiarity of both Canadian issuers and
35

In fact, there have been two issues of ADRs by CBIs according to NYSE statistics; see infra Appendix 1.
In 2003, the total trade between the United States and Canada amounted to 391,523.4 million dollars.
The total trade between the United States and Mexico (the United States’ second biggest trading partner)
for the same year came to 231,471.8 million dollars. For 2004, as of June, the trade in goods between the
United States and Canada made up 20.0 % of the United States’ total trade in goods while trade between
the United States and Mexico made up 11.8 % of this total. These statistics come from the U.S Census
Bureau website. See Usha Mittoo, supra note 27.
37
See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation, 2
Theoretical Inquiries L 387 (2001); Merritt B. Fox, The Issuer Choice Debate, Theoretical Inquiries L 563
(2001); Mary S. Head & Roberta S. Karmel, Barriers to Foreign Issuer Entry into U.S. Markets, 24 LAW &
POL’Y. IN INT’L. BUS., at 199 (1993).
36
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their financial intermediaries with the U.S. market meant that the ADR product held little
attraction for them.
There are two implications for this paper which arise from the fact that Canadian issuers
do not use ADRs. The first implication is that many of the studies looking at FPIs in the
U.S. markets and cross-listing, in particular, have simply overlooked the most important
subset of the market, Canadian issuers, because the data supporting the research is based
on the existence of an ADR program.39 The use of ADRs by foreign issuers in the United
States has been so widespread, and the data associated with their use so visible, that some
studies assume that ADRs represent the entire, or at least, most significant, universe of
foreign issuers in the United States. 40

The second implication goes directly to the heart of the bonding hypothesis. Because
Canadian issuers do not use ADRs to list or trade their securities in the United States,
their securities are, on their face, indistinguishable from those of domestic U. S. issuers.
There is no “ADR” moniker to raise the red flag of “foreign private issuer”; the securities
do not “signal” to the market.

Furthermore, CBIs deliberately avoid signaling. Distinguishing features in the corporate
names of the older, established CBIs tend to disappear upon entry into the U.S. market;
Bell Canada Enterprises becomes BCE; Bank of Montreal becomes BMO Group;
38

See supra note 2.
Id. See generally Jerry Feigen, Potential Exiting Through ADRs (and/or GDRs?) for International
Private Equity Investor, 13 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 109 (1997); Joseph Velli: American Depository Receipts:
An Overview, 17 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 38 (1994); Bruce L. Hertz, American Depository Receipts,

39
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Toronto Dominion Bank becomes TD (as in TD Waterhouse, now TD Ameritrade). As
for more recently established corporations, national or geographic identifiers are not
there; RIM did not choose to call itself “BlackBerry of Canada”. 41 The CBIs are
deliberately opting for a strategy of blending into the woods of the U.S. domestic
marketplace.

This chameleon-like behavior is one factor which undermines the bonding hypothesis, in
so far as it might have been applicable to CBIs. CBIs are not signaling to the market in a
way predicted by the bonding hypothesis; quite the contrary.42

B. Regulatory Choice
Unlike other FPIs, many Canadian issuers also have a greater choice of regulatory
regime when it comes to entering the United States, through a listing or otherwise.
Currently, there are three different regulatory options available to the larger Canadian
issuers raising capital or listing in the United States. Over the decades, Canadian issuers
PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, COMMERCIAL LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, 600
PLI/Comm 237 (1992).
40
Id.
41
It is likely that only the unfortunate, and extremely high profile, encounter with the vagaries of the U.S.
patent system brought public attention to RIM’s country of origin. In this regard, there may be another
interesting analogy to patent law. Moore’s article discusses patents and xenophobia; foreign companies
register a large number of patents in the U.S. but, proportionally, lose their infringement cases more
frequently. See Kimberly Moore, Xenophobia in American Courts, 97 NW. U. L. Rev. 1497 (2003).
RIM’s very public woes over its patent disputes (any publicity is good publicity) may be leading to a
change in strategy for subsequent CBIs listing in the United States. Tim Horton’s, a donut/light meal
chain, is an icon in Canada, but relatively unknown in the United States. It listed on the NYSE very shortly
after RIM settled its infamous patent dispute in early 2006. The NYSE took out a full page ad in the Wall
Street Journal to trumpet the Tim Horton listing. The headline ran: “T HE NEW YORK STOCK
EXCHANGE. NOW SERVING CANADA’S FRESHEST NEW LISTING”. The layout and style of the
ad was evocative of a similar full page ad published in the Wall Street Journal a few days earlier by RIM
(which is listed on NASDAQ). Is the implication that that coffee and donuts are as essential to the
functioning of the US economy as the ubiquitous BlackBerry? See WALL ST. J., Thursday, March 30,
2006, at A7.
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have always been identified by the SEC as a case apart; foreign, yes, but not quite foreign
enough43

1. The Canadian Issuer as U.S. Issuer

Canadian issuers can always choose to register and report as a domestic U.S. issuer,
subject to the same rules and oversight as any other U.S. issuer. In fact, for decades,
Canadian issuers were required to do so; they did not benefit from accommodations
provided by the SEC to non-U.S. issuers.44

Some Canadian issuers have deliberately made this decision, despite the duplication and
costs associated with compliance with different regulatory and accounting requirements.
For some CBIs, the costs were outweighed by a possible marketing advantage of being
perceived as a U.S. issuer.45 Over the years, these Canadian issuers may even lose their
status as a FPI, as the majority of trading in their equity securities migrates to the United
States 46

42

On the other hand, from an investor’s rather than an issuer’s point of view, by blending into the U.S.
market, CBIs may be producing a similar effect to FPIs using ADRs to signal to the market.
43
For many years after the introduction of the “F-series” forms, which provide certain exemptions to FPIs
from U.S. disclosure obligations, Canadian issuers were excluded by an instruction in the 20-F Form and
required to file as domestic U.S. issuers. See also Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 4708, 29 FR 9828
(July 9, 1964). Since 1991, Canadian issuers have been permitted to use the “F-series” forms See SEC
Multijurisdictional Disclosure and Modifications to the Current Registration and Reporting System for
Canadian Issuers, 56 Fed. Reg. 30,036 (July 1, 1991)(announcing the adoption of revisions to existing rules
and forms to permit registration and reporting under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 by Canadian foreign private issuers on the same basis as other foreign private issuers).
44
Id.
45
Nortel, for example, has never filed F-series forms.
46
In 2004, twenty-one Canadian companies filed S-1 forms and sixty Canadian companies filed 10-K
forms. These statistics are compiled from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) website at
http://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/srch-edgar. See infra Appendix 3 and Appendix 4.
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2. The Canadian Issuer as FPI
Since 1991, a second, previously closed, route is open to Canadian issuers registering
securities with the SEC, the “F-series” of foreign issuer registration and reporting
forms.47 Usage of these forms clearly identifies the issuer as a foreign issuer and
provides certain accommodations with respect to line item disclosure (for example, with
respect to individual executive compensation), financial reporting (reconciliation to US
GAAP), the use of home country reporting for continuous disclosure and an exemption
from US proxy and short swing profit rules. Insofar as regulatory filings with the SEC,
although not the actual form of the security, the decision to use the F-series forms would
place a CBI on common footing with other foreign private issuers using ADRs as their
US trading vehicle.48 For investors not delving into the regulatory filings too deeply,
however, the securities themselves, as listed or traded, would still not be “signaling” to
the market, given that they are not identified as ADRs.

3. The Canadian Issuer as Canadian Issuer

The third registration and reporting option open to certain Canadian issuers is the
Multijurisdictional Disclosure System (MJDS), specifically negotiated between the SEC
and Canadian regulators over a five year-period and implemented in 1991.49 Despite its
name, the system is bilateral, not multilateral, and so exclusively available to Canadian

47

See supra note 23.
Id. In 2004, 252 Canadian companies filed 20-F forms. This statistic is from the SEC website at
http://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/srch-edgar. See infra Appendix 5.
49
See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,036 (July 1, 1991).
48
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issuers entering the U.S. capital markets (and vice versa).50 The system had originally
envisaged the participation of the United Kingdom which dropped out of negotiations at
an early stage.51

The MJDS is based on principles of mutual recognition, similar to those operating
between member states in the European Union and is largely supported by a high degree
of harmonization of regulatory frameworks in the U.S. and Canada. Although based on
principles of mutuality, which would envisage entry of U.S. issuers into Canada under the
system as well as Canadian issuers into the United States, the system in operation has
been virtually a one-way street, running north-south.52

Implementation of the MJDS coincides with the exponential growth of NYSE and
NASDAQ listings by CBIs in the 1990s. Coincidence? However, the basic premise of
the MJDS is somewhat at odds with the tenets of the bonding hypothesis. CBIs making
use of the MJDS are not subjecting themselves to the rigors of SEC oversight and the
entire panoply of U.S. investor protection mechanisms. They are not “bonding”.

The whole thrust of the MJDS is to permit Canadian issuers to enter the U.S. market,
using Canadian disclosure documentation and subject to the immediate oversight of

50

Only a handful of US issuers have entered the Canadian market using the MJDS; see infra note 52.
The SEC indicated its intention to extend it to other foreign countries such as the United Kingdom and
Japan. See EDWARD E. GREENE ET. AL., U.S. REGULATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES AND
DERIVATIVES MARKETS 8-5 (3d ed. 1995).
52
In 2004, there were approximately 152 Canadian MJDS filers with the SEC, using the special form 40-F;
in contrast, for the same period, there were only seven U.S. issuers filing MJDS to enter Canadian markets.
Statistics are compiled from the SEC data on the SEC website at http://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/srch-edgar.
See infra Appendix 6.
51
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Canadian regulators, not the SEC.53 The purpose of the MJDS was to promote ease of
access and to avoid the costs of regulatory duplication. Canadian issuers using the
MJDS to enter the United States are neither intending to, nor in fact, “signaling”
adherence to “higher” U.S. standards of investor protection , tougher regulation or higher
regulatory scrutiny.

54

There are two caveats, however, which modulate the MJDS system. The MJDS is a
complex, bilateral, regulatory initiative which even at the outset demonstrated certain
asymmetric features that detracted from principles of “pure” mutual recognition. For
example, the SEC insisted on retaining the possibility of U.S. liability attaching to a
disclosure document prepared under Canadian rules and subject to Canadian regulatory
oversight. 55 This particular asymmetry clearly undermines operation of principles of
mutual recognition which would have recognized the operation of Canadian liability
under Canadian standards and interpretation. Another, similar, asymmetry was the
requirement for full reconciliation of financial statements for certain offerings (primarily
equity offerings), to U.S. GAAP.56
The second caveat arises from the first, at least in part. The potential for U.S. liability
attaching to Canadian disclosure documentation left Canadian issuers particularly open to
arguments (usually, of U.S. counsel) suggesting that, despite the ability to use Canadian
disclosure in the United States, the more prudent course would be to meet both Canadian
53

The SEC did retain a certain amount of discretion to exercise, on an exceptional basis, residual oversight
of Canadian issuers’ MJDS offerings.
54
See Hal S. Scott, The Future Content of the U.S. Securities Laws: Internationalization of Primary Public
Securities Markets, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 71, 82 (2000) (describing SEC’s attempts to eliminate the
MJDS program and quoting Edward Alden, Canadians Mobilise Over Loss of MJDS, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 1,
1999, at 34).
55
See supra note 49.
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and U.S. disclosure standards. This argument further buttressed arguments (usually, of
U.S. investment bankers) suggesting that Canadian-style disclosure be made to look more
like U.S disclosure, for marketing, not regulatory, reasons. Thus, Canadian prospectuses
used in MJDS transactions began to look more and more, in style and substance, like U.S.
issuer prospectuses, despite the fact that, technically, they were not required to comply
with U.S. line item disclosure. In an interesting twist, the reconciliation to U.S. GAAP
requirement (where equity securities have been issued under the MJDS) has resulted in
the major CBIs (the big Canadian banks) lobbying, successfully, for the acceptance of US
GAAP in Canada in fulfillment of Canadian regulatory requirements, thus avoiding the
expense and complications of reconciliation in the United States 57

56

See supra note 49.
Section 70 of the Regulations currently stipulates that the financial statements referred to in section 155
of the Canada Business Corporations Act (“CBCA”) must be prepared in accordance with generallyaccepted accounting principles (GAAP) as set out in the Handbook of the Canadian Institute of Chartered
Accountants. Section 71 of the Regulations provides that the auditor's report referred to in section 169 of
the Canada Business Corporations Act must be prepared in accordance with generally-accepted auditing
standards (GAAS) as set out in the Handbook of the Canadian Institute of Chartered
Accountants. In 2004, the Canadian Securities Administrators (“CSA”) released the National
Instrument 52-107: Acceptable Accounting Principles, Auditing Standards and Reporting Currencies, NI
52-107 (January 16, 2004). The regulatory amendments are designed to harmonize sections 70 and 71 of
the Regulations with the rules established by NI-52-107. NI 52-107 allows corporations registered with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to use standards recognized in the United States, i.e.
GAAP and GAAS, for the preparation and audit of their annual and interim financial statements. NI 52-107
applies to financial years starting January 1, 2003 and later.
The amendments would allow CBCA corporations registered with the SEC to prepare financial
statements according to U.S. GAAP as established by the Financial Accounting Standards Board of the
United States. CBCA corporations registered with the SEC changing from Canadian GAAP to U.S. GAAS
would have to set relevant information in the notes of the financial statements for two years following the
change. The notes would indicate significant differences between Canadian and U.S. GAAS concerning
accounting, measurement and presentation. Also, these notes would include an assessment of the impact
resulting from any significant difference between both countries' accounting principles, as well as
information consistent with the requirements of the Canadian GAAP.
Corporations registered with the SEC that have produced financial statements according to both
Canadian and U.S. GAAP for at least two years before changing to only U.S. GAAP would be required to
include a note explaining the significant differences between the Canadian and U.S. GAAP regarding
recognition, measurement and presentation as well as quantifying these differences. The amendments
would also allow CBCA corporations registered with the SEC to prepare the auditor's report mentioned in
section 169 of the CBCA according to the GAAS established by the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board of the United States. See Industry Canada website at
http://strategis.gc.ca/engdoc/main.html.
57
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IV. Canadian-based Issuers and the Bonding Hypothesis
Despite the asymmetries in the MJDS and their very practical consequences, the use of
the MJDS by Canadian issuers does argue against the bonding hypothesis as an
explanation of the exponential increase in cross-listings by Canadian issuers in the 1990s.
Nevertheless, there has been some academic commentary wrestling to apply the bonding
hypothesis to Canadian issuers 58 Two related assertions have been made in this context
of applying the bonding hypothesis to CBIs: (i) the “level of investor protection in the
United States is qualitatively higher than in Canada” 59and (ii) the ownership structure of
Canadian firms is more highly concentrated than in the United States.60
These two assertions are intertwined in the bonding literature. The bonding hypothesis
assumes that the motivation for cross-listing is the issuer’s desire to signal its voluntary
compliance with a “stronger” regulatory regime which provides greater investor
protection. An associated body of literature has observed that corporations coming from
jurisdictions with “weaker” regimes of shareholder/investor protections tend to
demonstrate a more highly concentrated form of ownership structure than corporations in
the United States.61 Since Canadian corporations demonstrate a concentrated form of
ownership structure, this may indicate “weaker” corporate governance and shareholder
protections, thus providing the motivation to cross-list and to “bond”, the argument goes.
Both of these assertions merit closer scrutiny.

58

See King & Segal, supra note 21.
Id. at 1.
60
Id. at 2.
59

19

A. Concentrated corporate ownership patterns

Beginning with the second assertion, Canadian corporations generally do demonstrate a
more highly concentrated form of ownership than U.S. corporations.62 However, in this
regard, the United States is clearly the exception and not the rule across jurisdictions. To
a greater or lesser degree, every country in the world, even the U.K. with its vibrant
capital markets, 63 demonstrates greater concentration of corporate ownership than the
United States. 64 By virtue of this fact, any corporation seeking to cross-list in the United
States will likely demonstrate a more concentrated form of ownership than its similarly
positioned U.S. peers.
The prevalence of a concentrated corporate ownership structure should not be
automatically associated with “weaker” investor/shareholder protections. The United
States does not have the regulatory monopoly on investor/shareholder protections, as
discussed below. Concentrated ownership patterns definitely do present the danger of
minority shareholder expropriation, at the hands of the majority shareholder. However, so
does the widely dispersed pattern of corporate ownership usually associated with United
61

See Rafael La Porta, et al., supra note 33; Coffee, supra note 2.
See R. Daniels & J. MacIntosh, Towards a Distinctive Canadian Corporate Law Regime, 29 OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 863 (1991).
63
In 2003, the London Stock Exchange had more listed companies than the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) and only the NYSE and the NASDAQ had greater total values of share trading for that year.
These statistics come from the World Federation of Exchanges website at
http://www.fibv.com/WFE/home.asp?menu=315.
64
For statistics regarding ownership concentration in Europe, see Torben Pedersen & Steen Thomsen,
European Patterns of Corporate Ownership: A Twelve-Country Study, J. INT’L BUS. STUDIES 28(4), at
759-778 (1997); Marco Becht & Ailsa Roel, Blockholding in Europe: An International Comparison, 43
Eur. Econ. Rev. 1049 (1999) (discussing the size of block sharholdings in Europe and reporting that while
ownership is much more dispersed in the U.K compared to continental Europe, it is still significantly
more highly concentrated than in the U.S.); La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, Corporate
62
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States capital markets, the potential expropriators being management rather than majority
shareholders. 65

The important point to retain in any discussion of ownership patterns and
shareholder/investor protection is that the problem may differ, depending on the
prevailing ownership structure. As the problem differs, so may the solutions. In fact, the
perception that there even is a problem may not be one that is universally shared. 66 With
respect to CBIs in particular, the relationship between the pattern of concentrated
ownership and shareholder/investor protection is discussed below.67
B. Investor protection in the United States is superior

The assertion that the ownership structure of Canadian firms is more highly concentrated
than in the United States is demonstrably true.68 The assertion that the level of investor
protection in the United States is qualitatively higher than in Canada is not so
demonstrably true. 69 Should the level of investor protection in Canada be equal to or
better than in the United States, what are the implications for the bonding hypothesis and
Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999) (finding that only a few economies have many
corporations that are widely held).
65
Under the “agency cost” theory, managers are "agents" for the shareholders. See e.g., Daniel R. Fischel,
The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1263-65 (1982). See Christopher J.
Gulinello, The Revision of Taiwan’s Company Law: The Struggle Toward a Shareholder-oriented Model in
One Corner of East Asia, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 75, 94 (2003): “...if a concentrated-ownership system
develops shareholder protections that deal exclusively with protection from controlling shareholder
expropriation, then there will be risks of expropriation at the hands of management as ownership becomes
more disperse and agency costs related to the monitoring of management increase.”
66
Asian markets, eg Hong Kong. Some commentators note that investors may be compensated in other
ways where dual class voting structures, and the concomitant opportunities for minority shareholder
expropriation, are prevalent; higher dividends, for example, in European companies or lower valuations,
indicating that investors are getting what they pay for. See Second Class Investors, supra note 14.
67
See infra note 128.
68
See King & Segal, supra note 21.
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CBIs? Going beyond CBIs, what may be the implications for other non-U.S. issuers
listing on U.S. exchanges?

The level of investor/shareholder protection is key to the bonding hypothesis. It is also
key to theories of corporate governance and the setting of international standards and
practices associated with the bonding hypothesis. The following discussion will
investigate the validity of the commonly held assumption that U.S. investor/shareholder
protections should provide the benchmark against which all others are measured and the
backbone of international standards. It will also investigate the Canadian
shareholder/investor protections to determine if the bonding hypothesis is explanatory of
CBIs.

V. Testing the Bonding Hypothesis

The validity of the bonding hypothesis is rooted in accepted notions of good corporate
governance: mechanisms will be in place to deter expropriation of investor/shareholders,
particularly at the hands of unscrupulous managers. An important body of economic
literature, the LLSV studies,70 has appeared over the last decade postulating indicia of
investor protections and gathering and comparing data across a large number of
jurisdictions.71 The efforts have been impressive and the data accumulated formidable.
These studies are some of the most widely cited in the area, and until very recently, their
conclusions considered virtually self-evident and the starting point for numerous other
69
70

See infra Part IV.B.2.
See Rafael La Porta, et al., supra note 33.
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investigations. The findings of the LLSV studies have themselves played into the
development of international standards of corporate governance.
The comparative analysis provided by the LLSV studies, though welcome, gave some
financial economists and legal academics pause however, and the early work is now
being reconsidered by certain of the original authors themselves.72 The application of a
little comparative legal theory may unearth the source of this unease with the early LLSV
literature which supports the bonding hypothesis.

A. Complexity
“Legal systems are the result of a layered complexity… .”73 Legal systems evolve over
time, inventing, adapting, borrowing, having change thrust upon them. Statutory law, in
particular, often contains redundancies, contradictions, and fossilized concepts or
practices of no current significance.74 Any one legal concept in any one system, at any
one time, exists and operates in a complex relationship to a myriad of other concepts:
“legal systems never are. They always become”.75
Statutory law is perhaps the most visible and accessible layer of any legal system. It is
not surprising then that financial economists, in searching for indicia of various kinds,
71

Id.
See RAGHURAM G. RAJAN & LUIGI ZINGALES, THE GREAT REVERSALS: THE POLITICS OF FINANCIAL
DEVELOPMENT IN THE 20TH CENTURY (CRSP Working Paper No. 526, June 2001); Mark Roe, Corporate
Law’s Limits, 31:2 J. LEGAL STUD. 233 (2002); Coffee, supra note 2.
73
See Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World’s Legal Systems, 45 AM. J.
COMP. L. 5 (1997). For a more detailed examination of these concepts as they are applicable to corporate
governance mechanisms, see Cally Jordan, The Conundrum of Corporate Governance, 30 BROOK. J. INT’L
L. 983 (2005); Cally Jordan & Mike Lubrano, How Effective are Capital Markets in Exerting Governance
on Corporations? Recent Lessons from Emerging Markets in Financial Sector Governance: The Roles of
the Public and Private Sectors (Washington: Brookings Press, 2002).
72
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look primarily to statutory law. Statutory law, however, may only be the tip of the
iceberg, indicating a large, complex, structure submerged beneath the surface. The true
significance of statutory law, too, may not be what it seems; its role and importance in
positing legal principles can vary from system to system. 76

Adding to the complexity of the operation of “formal” normative propositions is another
complex layer, sometimes referred to as “legal sensibilities”. 77 Legal sensibilities consist
not only of “rules and principles which can be cast in propositional form, but also of
higher order understandings, received techniques, constellations of values, and shared
ways of perceiving reality, which are pervasive, often subtle, and themselves deeply
layered in complex and important ways”78 .

This is not good news for the econometric analysis of legal concepts across a large
number of jurisdictions, even with the use of reliable data bases and the cooperation of
hundreds of volunteer gatherers and interpreters of data.79 Despite the extraordinary
74

See Lucian Bebchuk & Mark Roe, A Theory of Path Dependency in Corporate Ownership and
Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999).
75
See Mattei, supra note 73.
76
See Jordan, Conundrum of Corporate Governance, supra note 73; KATHARINA PISTOR AND CHENGGANG
XU, INCOMPLETE LAW - A CONCEPTUAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE
EVOLUTION OF FINANCIAL MARKET REGULATION (Colum. L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 204, May
2002).
77
See Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective, reprinted in LOCAL
KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY, at 167-234 (Basic Books, 1983).
78
See RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER, ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES, TEXT, MATERIALS, (Foundation
Press, 6th ed., 1998).
79
Djankov et al, infra note 147, at 4: “Our data are based on answers to a questionnaire completed by
attorneys from Lex Mundi law firms. Lex Mundi is an association of international law firms with members
in 108 countries. We invited Lex Mundi firms to participate in the project and received complete answers
from 102 of them. After processing the authors’ answers, we conducted follow-up conference calls to seek
clarifications and asked respondents to confirm our coding of the data. The sample we use in this paper is
based on the answers of 72 authors who have confirmed the validity of our data. The countries included in
the sample represent 99.3% of total world market capitalization in 2003.” Despite this impressive massing
of resources, there are nagging difficulties associated with the collection and comparability of the data.
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amount of information which is being made available with respect to corporate
governance and investor protections around the world, isolating indicia of investor
protection across jurisdictions is very hard.80 A factor which may be highly significant in
one system may be completely lacking in another, with little or no impact on the
effectiveness of investor protection mechanisms.

Drawing indicia from corporate statutes, the easiest and most obvious source, may also
be highly misleading, depending on the role of statutory law in a system (peripheral,
supplemental, fundamental) or even, simply, the age of the statute.

Purely as a matter

of positive law, formally recognized normative rules, corporate law demonstrates its own
“layered complexity”.
In addition, each body of corporate law is highly path dependent,81 retaining the imprint
of the specific historical forces which have formed it. Also, the principles of corporate
law have drawn and depend upon a variety of other, older and more fundamental areas of
the law: property, contract, agency or mandate, trust law, status, procedural
constitutional and administrative law. Each of these other areas of law varies from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and differs in its importance in the operation of corporate law.
Trust law, the source of the concept of fiduciary duties, for example, can be completely
absent in many legal systems, to no ill effect. Constitutional law can play a key role in
corporate law in some countries, in Latin America, for example.
One former securities regulator, whose law firm participated in the Lex Mundi project by devoting
hundreds of hours of junior lawyer time to completion of the questionnaire, expressed serious reservations
to the author as to the meaningfulness of the data collected and its comparability across a large number of
jurisdictions. Very few law firm members of Lex Mundi, this participant noted, would have the capacity or
resources to engage in such efforts, on an uncompensated and largely unacknowledged basis.
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Digging at little deeper, the fundamental principles of corporate law may not be found in
the “corporate law” at all, but rather in the Civil Code.82 It is even possible to have
corporate law without clearly established notions of private property. 83 In the United
States, large swathes of corporate law are now subsumed under “securities regulation” 84
or left to the courts, the stock exchanges and corporations themselves. Then there is the
legal, political and commercial context in which corporate law, in its wider and narrower
senses, operates; corporate law is permeated by “legal sensibilities” .

These “interaction effects impede putting our finger on one or two key features as
indicative of whether technical corporate law is overall good or bad”. 85 Nevertheless,
the influential early LLSV literature attempted to isolate indicia of investor protection 86
in formulating its analysis of shareholder and creditor rights in various jurisdictions. In
particular, certain “anti-director” indicia, representing the presence of investor protection
mechanisms, were isolated and an “index” formulated.

The anti-director indicia chosen as an indicator of the presence of meaningful
shareholder rights, were: (i) one share/one vote or multiple voting shares; (ii) proxy

80

See Roe, supra note 72, at 28.
See Roe & Bebchuck, supra note 74.
82
The Dutch Civil Code (1992) is where you find Dutch corporate law, for a number of interesting
historical reasons.
83
Eg China, Vietnam
84
See the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 107 P.L. 204 (2002)(“SOX”). See also Mark Roe, Delaware’s Competition,
117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003).
85
See Roe, supra note 72 at 32.
86
See Rafael La Porta, et al., Law and Finance, supra note 33. It should be noted here that certain of the
LLSV authors, together with Simeon Djankov of The World Bank, have recently prepared a “revised”
index; see Djankov et al, infra note 147.
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voting by mail; (iii) shares not blocked before shareholders’ meeting; (iv) cumulative
voting for board of directors; (v) oppressed minorities mechanism; (vi) existing
shareholders have preemptive rights for new equity issues; (vii) percentage of share
capital (eg 5% or 10%) to call an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting. LLSV indicates a
“yes” for each of these indicia (except (iii)) for both the United States and Canada; each
of the United States and Canada receives a 5 on the Anti Directors Rights Index (6 being
high). Both Canada and the United States, according to the index are highly investor
protective, and in the same way.

On their face, these indicia look familiar and straight-forward; they have been often
repeated in the corporate governance literature in the intervening years. The indicia are
taken, for the most part, from corporate statutes in the United States. However, as
indicators of shareholder rights and the level of protection which investors in publicly –
traded, listed corporations may expect, even in the United States, the indicia are more or
less meaningless. Roe in Corporate Law’s Limits (2002) tactfully pointed this out:
“Wall Street lawyers might have reservations about heavily using preemptive rights,
cumulative voting and the minimum percentage needed to call a special shareholders
meeting – items not likely to be near the top of most American lawyers’ lists of Delaware
corporate law’s most important legal protections …” 87. But then, these “anti-director”
indicia have little to do with listed corporations in the United States, Delaware or
otherwise.
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See Roe, supra note 72, at 29, fn 37.
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Here are some examples of how complexity undermines the “anti-director indicia” of
econometric theory. The yes and no answers on the LLSV index are seriously
misleading, even in the United States.

Although most (but not all) of the anti-director indicia are drawn from corporate statutes,
not all U.S. corporate statutes have the indicia. There are fifty corporate statutes in the
United States and great diversity of approach. The “oppressed minorities mechanism”,
for example, is not present in some state statutes (Florida, for example) and where it is
present, may only be applicable in limited circumstances to shareholders in privately or
closely-held corporations, providing no protection whatsoever for investors in publicly
traded corporations.

It may be possible under all state statutes to create cumulative voting rights (a
cumbersome, old-fashioned, procedural means of promoting, but not necessarily
ensuring, minority shareholder representation on the board of directors). However,
cumulative voting rights are rarely used (because they are not very effective), and
certainly not for a listed U.S. corporation, if you can help it.88
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Some Korean issuers have been saddled with cumulative voting. FINAL REPORT AND LEGAL
REFORM RECOMMENDATIONS to the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Korea, 26 Iowa J. Corp.
L. 546 (2001). The Final Report recommended making the practice of cumulative voting mandatory. That
recommendation was not included in the Act. Korea established a voluntary cumulative voting system in
1998, but few companies have adopted it. As of late May 2000, twenty-two percent of KSE listed
companies (155 out of 707) have adopted it. See Ministry of Finance and Economy, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IMPROVEMENT PLAN FOR TRANSPARENT MANAGEMENT (Oct. 27, 2000), available at
http://www.mofe.go.kr/cgi-pub/content.cgi?code=e fp&no=35 (last visited Nov. 5, 2001). See also Cho
Young-sam, Activist Group Moving to Legislate Cumulative Voting, Class-Action Suits, Korea Herald, Oct.
17, 2000, available at 2000 WL 27394157.
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Equally, the creation of preemptive rights (a means of avoiding dilution of existing
shareholder equity positions) may be possible under all U.S. corporate statutes but would
never be found in a listed U.S. corporation as a matter of course (whereas they might in a
British company).

A statutory provision permitting a 10% shareholder to call an extraordinary meeting of
shareholders, again, in the United States, would be irrelevant to most publicly listed
corporations which are widely-held.89

These are provisions which, where applicable, are more likely used in close or privatelyheld corporations; in such circumstances there is usually an identity of management and
ownership. Shareholders more or less take care of themselves through negotiated means,
the statute providing a set of default rules that are easily avoided.

Corporate law, where it matters for public shareholders and investors, is mostly
elsewhere, buried in layers of complexity.90 Corporate law statutes in the United States
have been twisted and gutted by initiatives of the Delaware legislature and the Delaware
Court of Chancery on the one hand, and federal “securities” regulation and the SEC, on
the other.91 Contractual ordering (which breeds variation, specificity and, inevitably,
complexity) dominates the corporate landscape: stock exchange listing rules, corporate
89

Even the largest institutional investors in U.S. corporations usually hold no more than 2-3 % of the
outstanding shares of any one issuer. For example, as of December 31, 2005, the fifteen largest
institutional investors in Microsoft each held between 0.6% and 4.1% of the outstanding shares. See
http://moneycentral.msn.com/investor/invsub/ownership/ownership.asp?Symbol=msft (3/22/2006).
90
There has been much written about the great complexity of Sarbanes-Oxley. See, e.g., The trial of
Sarbanes-Oxley, THE ECONOMIST, April 22, 2006, at 59.
91
See Roe, supra note 84; see also Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 84.

29

charters, customized share provisions, tailor-made by-laws .92 The inadequacy of the
“anti-director indicia” to capture the complex dynamic of public shareholder rights in the
United States should be obvious at this point. Applying these indicia across jurisdictions
to produce meaningful results is even more problematic. The premise is wrong 93 and the
criteria for comparison irrelevant.
B. Hidden Assumptions
One of the objectives of comparative legal scholarship is to “unearth, by comparative
study, the hidden assumptions of different legal systems…, particularly those legal
assumptions that are so obvious that they are never discussed, or even noticed”.94
Uncovering and testing some of the assumptions underlying the bonding hypothesis may
cast the hypothesis in a different light.

1. U.S. Investor Protection and Shareholder Rights are the Best
Key to the bonding hypothesis as explanatory of foreign cross-listing is the high level of
investor protection in the United States. Effective, enforceable shareholder rights are
usually viewed as a prime component of investor protection. The early LLSV literature,
with its indicia of shareholder rights and “anti-director” index, has been frequently
invoked in investigations related to the bonding hypothesis (and other aspects of financial

92

A simple by-law amendment put into effect by a short written consent of the majority shareholder was
sufficient to disable the board of directors and set the cat among the pigeons in the Hollinger International
disputes in 2004. Although completely in conformity with Delaware statutory law, the by-law amendment
was subsequently overturned by Vice-Chancellor Leo Strine, exercising his equitable jurisdiction. See
Hollinger International Inc. v. Conrad M. Black, et al. C.A. No. 183-N (Feb 26 2004).
93
“Anti-director” based on agency theory, i.e. the management/shareholder conflict which may not be the
actual dynamic operating; cf Hollinger, supra note 92 .
94
See Mattei, supra note 73.
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market development).95 The United States (and Canada, for that matter) scored high.96
These particular indicia of shareholder rights have become self-propagating, spreading,
along with class actions and derivative rights of action, as effective corporate governance
mechanisms, to the furthest reaches of corporate law around the world.97
The assumption appears to be that U.S. mechanisms for investor protection and
shareholders rights are, if not the best, then, at the least, the benchmark against which all
others should be measured. How else to account for such a vibrant financial market as
exists in the United States? But, is this one of those pernicious “hidden assumptions”, so
obvious that it is “never discussed, or even noticed”? 98 This assumption bears some
scrutiny as does its implications for the mechanisms of investor protections and
shareholder rights in domestic legal systems outside the United States.

Many non-U.S. legal systems have been referred to as “weak legal systems”99 if they do
not score high on the LLSV “anti-director” index. This is the classic blunder of the
amateur comparativist, confounding difference with deficiency. If an indicia, in this case,
of shareholders’ rights, is “missing” from a legal system, it must be a sign of a
deficiency, contributing to a lower level of economic development, and an oversight to
be remedied100. This is simply not the case.
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See e.g. Coffee, supra note 2; King & Segal, supra note 21.
See Rafael La Porta, et al., Law and Finance, supra note 33. See table 2.
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Recently proposed or enacted corporate legislation in places as different as Bahrain and China now
contain or propose such provisions, likely to no great effect on corporate governance.
98
Arguably not, since there is such a large body of legal analysis produced on an annual basis providing a
blow by blow critique.
99
See Rafael La Porta, et al., supra note 33.
100
Rudolf B. Schlesinger, et al., supra note 78. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The
Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. Rev. 641,
643-48 (1999).
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As Roe remarks, “[n]ot only do corporate players in France, Germany, Scandinavia think
their corporate law is fine, but they sometimes proclaim its superiority in some
dimensions over the American variety” 101 Insofar as formal shareholders’ rights are
concerned, this is a claim to take seriously.

Corporate law statutes in the United States

provide shareholders, in particular shareholders of publicly-traded corporations, with
paltry and basically illusory rights compared to most European statutes, 102 particularly
since the legislative reaction to the 1985 Delaware decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom103.

Noted for the already strong managerial bias in its corporate statute, Delaware acted
shortly after the Van Gorkom decision to permit its corporations, by charter amendment,
to alleviate the duty of care owed by managers to shareholders.

In this, and other pro-

managerial, initiatives104, other state statutes followed suit, with two differences. In some
cases, the state statutes went even further than Delaware in favor of loosening the
remnants of shareholder fetters over management. Secondly, few states possessed a
judiciary with the authority in corporate law matters of the Delaware Court of Chancery,

101

See Roe, supra note 72 at 28.
A cursory perusal of the U.S. proxy materials for a European corporation, such as Nokia, for example,
indicates the much wider array of matters on which shareholders in a European corporation may have direct
oversight.
103
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d. 858 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1985).
104
The fact that Delaware corporate law is receptive to corporate management concerns and needs, often at
the expense of shareholders, is well known. This intentional courting of business interests through
legislative drafting and judicial decision making in Delaware has made it a haven for business and,
consequently, rich in law concerning corporate activities. See generally William L. Cary, Federalism and
Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the
Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 NW. U. L.
REV. 913 (1982); Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law of 1967, 117 U. PA.
L. REV. 861 (1969); James F. Ritter, Comment, Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 72 VA. L. REV. 851 (1986).
Janet E. Kerr, Delaware Goes Shopping for a “new" interpretation of the Revlon standard: the effect of the
QVC decision on strategic mergers, 58 ALB. L. REV. 609, 676 (1995).
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ready at a moment’s notice to redress potential imbalances between shareholders and
management. Not that the Delaware Court of Chancery necessarily rushes to do so. 105

Arguably, the fiduciary duty of managers (and possibly majority shareholders) is the
greatest source of protection from expropriation to which U.S. shareholders can look.
The fiduciary duty is not, strictly speaking, a shareholder right; it is a much more diffuse
concept (despite attempts at various statutory formulations). As an equitable principle,
based on notions of fairness, it is not amenable to bright line tests or econometric
analysis. It is a creation of the courts of equity and dependent on these same courts for
its vitality. Unhappily for shareholders of U.S. corporations, procedural and other bright
line tests, now found in statutory law and guidance such as the ALI Principles of
Corporate Governance, have provided U.S. courts (even Delaware courts, at times) a
means to avoid hard questions associated with the exercise of their equitable
discretion.106 sapping the fiduciary duty of its normative vigor.

All this to say, that things are even worse than they might at first appear for shareholders
in U.S. corporations. Enactment of the federal Sarbanes-Oxley legislation (technically,
not “corporate” legislation) is a symptom of, not necessarily the solution to, the plight of
the U.S. shareholder. In Delaware’s Competition, Roe ponders whether the Enron and
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See Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993): “The tools of good corporate practice are
designed to give a purchasing minority stockholder the opportunity to bargain for protection before parting
with consideration. It would do violence to normal corporate practice and our corporation law to fashion an
ad hoc ruling which would result in a court- imposed stockholder buy-out for which the parties had not
contracted.” See also Roe, supra note 84.
106
See 1 AMERICAN L. INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (1994).
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WorldCom debacles, which prompted Sarbanes-Oxley, might have been avoided, had
U.S. corporate statutes taken a different turn in 1986. 107

The Enron/WorldCom debacle has shaken somewhat the assumption of the superiority of
U.S. investor protection and shareholder rights. The early LLSV literature, however, was
written in the heady pre-debacle days and appears to have internalized the assumption of
a high level of formal investor protection through the operation of shareholder rights
found in state corporate statutes. As noted above, the “anti-director indicia” of the LLSV
studies are not, in fact, a measure of vibrant shareholder rights, and never have been.
In the United States, shareholders’ rights and investor protection have been decoupled.
Investor protections continue to operate outside the sphere of corporate law per se, in the
virtual absence of shareholders rights. At this point, it is unclear whether the noncorporate law mechanisms of investor protection (stock exchange listing rules, industry
associations, securities regulation and the Securities and Exchange Commission) will be,
or have been, able to fully compensate for the demise of basic principles associated with
shareholders rights. Some of these non-corporate law mechanisms are, inevitably,
skewed in favor of the interests of market intermediaries. And, the Byzantine maze of
complex technicalities that we know as securities regulation has its own limitations.108

It gets worse. The passage of Sarbanes-Oxley is also indicative of the erosion of certain
“legal sensibilities” that have complemented formal shareholders rights and investor
107

See Roe, supra note 84.
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protection. Is the corporate “Code of ethics” required by Sarbanes-Oxley a substitute for
commonly held tenets of fair dealing as a moral conviction which goes beyond the
diluted commercial standards now prevalent?109 Are these legal sensibilities another
hidden assumption which may no longer be operative?

2. U.S. Investor Protection and Minority Shareholder rights are better in
the United States than in Canada

Assumption number two, that U.S. investor protection and minority shareholder rights are
better in the United States than in Canada, must hold true for the bonding hypothesis to
be applicable to CBIs. If assumption number one, the superiority of U.S. investor
protections and shareholders rights, holds true, then assumption number two is axiomatic.
But assumption number one is seriously flawed.

The “anti-director indicia” of the early LLSV studies110 had Canada and the United States
in a dead heat with an index rating of 5 out of 6. Responses to presence of indicia were
identical, with the exception of percentage of share capital to call an extraordinary
shareholders’ meeting being lower (5%) in Canada than in the United States (10%). This
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In the aftermath of the disappearance of the accounting firm, Arthur Andersen, the debate over the
desirability of principles based accounting, rather than technical, rules based accounting, intensified.
109
The American Law Institute Principles of Corporate Governance, Part V, supra note 106, proposed a
commercial fair dealing standard. The NYSE also proposed rules requiring all listed companies to adopt a
code of business conduct that addresses issues including fair dealing. See Corporate Accountability and
Listing Standards Committee of NYSE, AMENDMENT NO. 1 TO THE NYSE’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
RULE PROPOSALS, at 20, available at www.nyse.com/pdfs/amend1-04-09-03.pdf (last visited on Sept. 5,
2004.) See also Marleen A. O'Connor, How Should We Talk About Fiduciary Duty? Directors' Conflict-ofInterest Transactions and the ALI's Principles of Corporate Governance, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 954, 961
(1993).
110
See Rafael La Porta, et al., supra note 33; King & Segal, supra note 21.
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would have indicated a marginally more shareholder-friendly environment in Canada.
On their face, these results would not be surprising, there being a good degree of
comparability in the corporate legislation in the two countries. The conclusion drawn
from the table would be that the level of shareholder rights, and concomitantly, investor
protection, in the two countries is similar.

As a very general proposition, this may be correct. If so, it would not lend strong
support to the bonding hypothesis as explanatory of CBIs’ cross-listing behavior.
Digging a little deeper though, differences begin to emerge. As in the United States,
cumulative voting and preemptive rights in Canada are fairly meaningless as a form of
investor protection. However, given the more concentrated ownership structure of
Canadian corporations, rights accorded to 5% shareholders (to call an extraordinary
general meeting, for example) are very real. Not only is the absolute threshold lower (5%
as opposed to 10%), it is not uncommon for an institutional shareholder in a publiclytraded corporation in Canada, alone or together with others, to meet the threshold.

Secondly, again unlike the United States, statutory oppressed minorities mechanisms are
also very real in Canada. There are several reasons for this. Much of Canadian corporate
legislation looks to both the United States and the United Kingdom as primary sources.
The outlines of the U.S. Model Business Corporations Act [1968] (MBCA) are readily
discernible in the Canada Business Corporations Act. 111 However, the Canadian
legislation is based on the earlier MBCA, not the current Revised Model Business
Corporations Act (1984) (RMBCA), The earlier MBCA is notably more shareholder
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protective than the current version 112 In addition, the Canadian statutes have not seen
shareholders’ rights, the ones that count, such as the fiduciary duty of managers,
compromised as severely as they have been in the United States in the aftermath of Smith
v. van Gorkom.
Most importantly, the oppression remedy113 in the Canadian statutes derives from U.K.,
not U.S., law. It traces its origins back to the “great mother” of Commonwealth
companies laws, the Companies Act of 1948 (U.K.)114. Unlike in the United States, this
shareholder remedy is an extremely broad and flexible one applicable to all corporations,
not just closely-held ones or in limited circumstances. It is thus a powerful weapon in the
arsenal of investor protection.

In fact, of all the Commonwealth variations of the statutory oppression remedy deriving
from the original one in the 1948 U.K. Act, the Canadian version is the broadest and
most shareholder-friendly. There are no procedural hurdles (such as exist in the
derivative action) and the action permits any aggrieved minority shareholder (as well as
other corporate actors, even creditors) their day in court. In the face of the statutory
oppression remedy of the U.K. variety, the U.S.-style statutory derivative action (also
present in Canadian law), has withered away.115
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Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S., c. C-44 (1985) .
Henry F. Johnson & Paul Bartlett, Jr., Is a Fistful of Dollars the Answer? A Critical Look at Dissenters’
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The oppression remedy is a broad, equitable one though and it is dependent on a judiciary
which shows no reticence in exercising its equitable jurisdiction. Like their U.K.
counterparts, with which they continue to share many legal sensibilities, the Canadian
courts have not hesitated to provide equitable relief in corporate law matters. 116 Given
the concentrated ownership structures of Canadian corporations (and the possibilities for
minority shareholder expropriation so presented), the courts have been highly solicitous
of minority shareholder rights. 117

Although not apparent on their face, certain of the “anti-director indicia” of the LLSV
literature, are, in fact, correlated to higher levels of investor protection in Canada,
although not in the United States. Shareholders rights under Canadian corporate law
continue to support other investor protection mechanisms; they have not become
“decoupled” to the extent they have in the United States. As for the formal investor
protections found in listing rules and securities regulation, on their face, they are very
similar in Canada and the United States thanks in part to the harmonizing forces of the
MJDS.

King and Segal however, look beyond the LLSV “anti-director indicia” and convergence
of the formal regulatory regimes, to question the level of investor protection in Canada
116

See e.g., Ford Motor Co. of Canada, Ltd. v. Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement Board, O.J. No.
191 (2004). Generally speaking, Canadian courts have “given the oppression remedy a very liberal
interpretation, both with respect to standing and the types of remedies that can be awarded.” Jeffrey S.
Leon & Sarah J. Armstrong, The Relevance of the Oppression Remedy as a Control on Corporate
Governance in Canada (2003); see Fasken Martineau website:
http://www.fasken.com/WEB/fmdwebsite.nsf/AllDoc/CB3263AD655EA90D85256D500067E7C6/$File/C
ORPORATEGOVERNANCE.PDF!OpenElement.
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They look to two indicators, the incidence of insider trading in Canada and the

number of investigations by the U.S. SEC of the activities of Canadian MJDS issuers.
Neither of these indicators however is conclusive of a lower level of investor protection
or shareholders’ rights in Canada.

There is no denying the existence of insider trading in Canada.119 In the past, the
fragmented nature of provincial securities regulation in Canada may also have made
prosecution of insider trading offences more problematic than in the United States.120
But is insider trading more egregious or more prevalent in Canada than in the United
States? Unclear. One industry participant (who was not convinced that insider trading in
Canada posed greater risks to investors than in the United States) noted that abuses
appeared concentrated in one particular natural resource industry, perhaps as many as
90% of them.121 And, insider trading, of course, is only one form of potential investor
abuse, albeit one which captures the public imagination with its resonances to Greek
tragedy and the gratifying spectacle of the mighty laid low.
117
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See King & Segal, supra note 21.
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See King & Segal, supra note 21 at 9.
120
See Cally Jordan, Lessons from the Bennett Affair, 38 MCGILL L.J. 1071 (1993). The Bennett Affair was
a high profile insider trading case involving a former premier of the Province of British Columbia and his
brother and the sale of certain shares over the Toronto Stock Exchange. Proceedings, judicial and
administrative, dragged on for several years in both Ontario (the place of execution of the trades) and
British Columbia (the place of residence of the initiators of the trades and where the trades were actually
initiated), each under different legislation and regulators. Jurisdictional difficulties hampered cooperation
among the various provincial regulators within Canada. Two large institutional investors reached a
settlement early on, leaving small retail investors the losers. Ironically, at the time, several provincial
regulators had entered into international Memoranda of Understanding regarding cooperation and
information sharing with regulators outside Canada, meaning that there could have been greater
cooperation internationally among regulators than there was domestically within Canada. Calls for a
national securities regulator in Canada have gone unheeded for decades. See Cally Jordan, Comment on
‘An Alternative Regulatory Model for Canada’: A View from Afar, Queen’s University Annual Business
Law Symposium 2001, at 59 (Scarborough: Carswell, 2002).
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The statistics quoted in the King and Segal paper on investigations by the SEC of
wrongdoing by MJDS issuers are also not strongly persuasive.122 Given the large number
of Canadian issuers in the U.S. market, the number of investigations does not seem
egregious and on a pro rata basis is no greater than for other FPIs. According to a senior
Toronto practitioner, “[i]n today’s environment it is difficult to imagine that the Canadian
market is less efficiently regulated than the United States market given that most of the
really egregious behaviour of late has taken place in the United States. Mr. King’s theory
may have had more legs some years ago but not now I think”.123

A more controversial proposition may be whether Canadian minority
shareholder/investor protection is better than that in the United States. As noted above in
the context of the comparison of minority oppression mechanisms, shareholder
protections are decidedly more robust in Canadian corporate statutes. The Canadian
statutory oppression remedy is a powerful deterrent to managerial malfeasance, as well as
a real and flexible tool for shareholder action. It is but one example of the way in which
Canadian corporate law has remained more heavily weighted in favor of shareholder
protection; there are other examples.124

121
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There has also not been the decoupling of corporate shareholder rights and securities law
investor protections that has occurred in the United States. In Canada, there has been an
ongoing interaction and overlap between corporate statutes and securities regulation.125
Jurisdictional competition there may be at certain levels, but the capital markets are
centered in Toronto, Ontario, a longstanding fact, made even more obvious by the recent
consolidation of all Canadian equity trading in the Toronto Stock Exchange (with one
minor exception). 126 The capital markets are subject to the oversight of a provincial
Ontario regulator and provincial securities regulation. Ontario has its own corporate
statute127 and the Ontario government can coordinate legislative initiatives in both
corporate and securities laws. It is as though the New York Stock Exchange and the SEC
both operated out of Delaware.

The regulatory environment has also been responsive to the concentrated ownership
structure characteristic of the Canadian corporate world. The correlation between
concentration of ownership and weak investor protection noted in the early LLSV
literature does not hold true in Canada. The takeover bid regime offers better protections
for public investors than in the United States. Many mergers and corporate
reorganizations require majority of the minority shareholder approvals. Where there are
dual class shares (often the case in concentrated ownership structures), mandatory
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As elsewhere, securities regulation has adapted more quickly to changing circumstances.
In 2001, the Toronto Stock Exchange consolidated as Canada’s major equity trading market.
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Canada has both federal and provincial corporate statutes, many but not all, showing a high degree of
harmonization and affinities to the MBCA. There is no federal or national securities regulator, only
provincial regulators, with some, like the Ontario Securities Commission which directly oversees the
Toronto Stock Exchange, obviously being more important than others.
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coattails or tag-along rights are usual.128 In fact, these Canadian regulatory techniques
have been emulated elsewhere as a means of improving corporate governance, increasing
investor protection and promoting investor confidence in capital markets. 129

In addition, securities law enforcement has demonstrated a different approach,
proceeding as it did from a different regulatory tradition. Despite the very sharp
convergence over the last decade and a half to a U.S.- style regulatory framework and
associated institutions, securities regulators in Canada continue to pursue policies of
intervention before or instead of prosecutorial or judicial action. Regulation of the
financial sector generally has been impressed with the benign British influences of
regulation by persuasion, the apocryphal “tea with the Governor of the Bank of England”
approach to financial sector regulation.130 Regulatory intervention is “prompt” and
“focused”.131
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Then there is the big fish in a small pond effect. As in other small countries, such as the
Netherlands or Scandinavia, which are also home to large international corporations, the
reputational stakes are arguably higher in Canada. Nortel sinks and virtually every small
investor in Canada gasps. There is nowhere in Canada for CBIs to hide, from regulators,
analysts or the public investor; legal sensibilities at work.

The above discussion is not intended as a panegyric to Canadian corporate and securities
regulation; like any other system, there are flaws, weaknesses, failures. And much to
learn from the United States experience. However, the point is to belie certain of the
hidden and not-so-hidden assumptions underlying the bonding hypothesis, as applicable
to CBIs.

Which leaves us with the question. What did account for the sudden interest in crosslisting by CBIs, and the particular way in which they do it?

VI. Home Bias and the Chameleon Effect

It is likely that the more traditional reasons for cross-listing, rather than the bonding
hypothesis, provide the motivation for the recent activities of CBIs. 132 In particular, the
integration of product and capital markets is likely a significant factor in CBI crosslisting. And, different sectors appear to have different motivations. Canada has a high
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technology industry (think BlackBerry) and a NASDAQ listing provides comparability,
as well as potential increased product visibility.

Rather than why CBIs are cross-listing, what may be of greater interest is how CBIs are
cross-listing. The bonding hypothesis may have been seductive when looking at Latin
American issuers, for example, 133 but CBIs appear to be adroitly making use of the
“home bias” phenomenon instead.

A number of recent studies have observed the “home bias” effect. Stated simply, home
bias means that U.S. investors tend to overweight domestic stocks in their common stock
portfolio.134 CBIs are not using a cross-listing to “bond”, i.e. to signal to the U.S. market
that they are voluntarily adhering to higher standards of corporate governance and
submitting themselves to more rigorous regulatory scrutiny and oversight in the United
States. Rather, CBIs are studiously avoiding any signaling effect whatsoever, 135
blending into the U.S. corporate woodwork. By passing themselves off as domestic U.S.
issuers, CBIs take advantage of the home bias effect to sneak into U.S. domestic
portfolios. This is a venerable tradition for CBIs, dating back to Nortel’s New York
Stock Exchange listing in 1975. 136 This is the “chameleon effect”.

133

See Coffee, supra note 2 at 19-23.
See Magnus Dahlquist, et al, Corporate Governance and the Home Bias, 38 JFQA 87 (2003); Tesar &
Werner, supra note 10.
135
As noted elsewhere, the very public patent woes of RIM may mark a reconsideration of this approach
for Canadian issuers; it may become desirable to signal “Canadianess” if such is associated with
innovative, essential gadgets.
136
Nortel changed its name around the time of first listing, used domestic U.S. filing forms (which at the
time it was obliged to use) and deliberately chose a “U.S.” look for its information documents. Nortel
134
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VII. Implications of the Chameleon Effect

The immediate implication of the chameleon effect is good news for U.S. investors.
They are getting the best of both worlds, albeit perhaps unwittingly. They are buying
what looks like U.S. domestic stock, which may be subject to the usual domestic judicial
recourses, and in some cases, the oversight and protections of U.S. securities regulation
and exchange rules. They are also getting the benefit of the oversight and penchant for
early intervention of the Canadian securities regulatory regime. But even better, U.S.
investors become Canadian shareholders, enjoying statutory and other rights and
protections likely beyond their wildest imaginings. 137

Over time, continued integration and deeper penetration of the U.S. market by a certain
segment of Canadian issuers appears inevitable. As trading volume grows in the United
States, some CBIs may lose their “foreign private issuer” status 138 and the current
flexibility which they enjoy in terms of how they enter the market. Status as an FPI, for
example, is a condition of use of the MJDS. Again over time, investors in the United
States may lose some of the benefits of greater shareholder protections under Canadian
law, as the chameleon effect is replaced by the Delaware/Canadian corporation.
Hollinger International Inc. may have been a precursor: a Delaware incorporated, New

listed in November 1975 and changed its name from Northern Electric to Northern Telecom in early 1976.
In 1995, it became NORTEL. Source: NYSE and NORTEL web sites.
137
Recent large settlements in Canada by Nortel may be bringing this fact to the attention of US investors.
Again, Nortel’s recent financial difficulties may have resulted in US investors paying greater attention to
the potential presented by Canadian remedies; in a recent representative action against Nortel in the United
States, plaintiffs lost but have refiled in Ontario (motion not yet heard). See Loc 302 and 612 International
Union of Operating Engineers v. Nortel Civil Action No. 04-CV-05954 (AP) (Judge Preska, SDNY).
138
One of the tests of FPI status is trading volume.
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York listed corporation, majority-controlled by a Canadian incorporated, Canadian (and
not U.S.) listed parent.139

In future, there may also be greater self-restraint on the part of Canadian issuers in
making the decision to cross-list. Already, there is speculation that the surge in crosslisting activity in the 1990s was fuelled, in part, by the distortions of the tech bubble 141
As well, some sectors do not appear to benefit as much as others from cross-listing142
giving support to the importance of product recognition and trade flows as determining
factors in the cross-listing decision. 143 Real estate companies and the grocery business
tend to stay home, tethered to local customers. And, finally, there is no doubt that the
regulatory and financial burdens imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley give Canadian issuers
pause, as they do their European counterparts. 144

More interestingly perhaps, are the implications of the chameleon effect that go beyond
CBIs. Where Canadian issuers have gone, will others follow? Is the Canadian
experience the precursor? Going forward, will other FPIs emulate CBIs, or will CBIs
remain a category apart. Israeli issuers, for example, also make use of the chameleon

139

In the recent Delaware reincorporation of Australian News Corp. in November 2004, a controversial
issue among Australian shareholders, was the loss of the benefit of the more shareholder protective
Australian corporate law regime. See THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD at http://www.smh.com.au/.
140
G. Andrew Karolyi, The World of Cross-Listings and Cross-Listings of the World: Challenging
Conventional Wisdom, Fisher College of Business, Ohio State University (October 6, 2005), available at
http://www.cob.ohiostate.edu/fin/faculty/karolyi/papers/The%20World%20of%20Cross%20Listings%20Survey.pdf.
141
See Coffee, supra 2 at 54.
142
See King & Segal, supra note 21.
143
See Coffee, supra note 2.
144
See infra note 150.
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effect.145 NAFTA, geographic proximity and cultural affinities are not explanatory in the
case of Israeli issuers, yet there is a similar phenomenon.146

Will more FPIs (the Chinese, for example) consider direct cross-listings of equity
securities (as they do in Hong Kong), without the additional expense and complexity of
creating ADR programs. The traditional benefits of ADR programs (currency
conversion, clearing and settlement services, information dissemination) are significantly
less compelling in the wired (or more aptly, wireless) world of today. Mainland Chinese
issuers listing in Hong Kong, for example, do not use a derivative form of security
comparable to ADRs. Will interest in the use of ADRs fade, in favor of direct listing?

As argued above, the bonding hypothesis has never been strongly persuasive as a
motivation behind cross-listing of CBIs. Of late, its explanatory force as a motivation for
other FPIs has also diminished with the events of recent years. The Enron/Worldcom
scandals seriously exposed the “hidden assumption” of the innate superiority of U.S.
investor protections. 147 The early LLSV literature, based upon this assumption, is being

145

See, Amir Licht, Managerial Opportunism and Foreign Listing: Some Direct Evidence 22(2) U. PA. J.
INT’L ECON. L. 325 (2000).

146

Coffee, supra note 2 at 23-25.
See DJANKOV, LA PORTA, LOPEZ-DE-SILANES, & SHLEIFER, THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF SELFDEALING (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11883, 2005), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w11883. In the (Revised) Anti-director rights index (Table XII) the United
States scores a 3 out of 6 as opposed to the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries which
score 4 or 5 out of 6. As noted above, the anti-director indicia, as an indicator of shareholder protection in
publicly traded companies are more or less meaningless. However, in this study at least, the authors have
chosen a methodology likely to produce more meaningful results; the field of inquiry is narrower and the
manner of soliciting information more open-ended (a fact pattern designed to elicit more accurate responses
based on the particular analysis which the facts would evoke in each jurisdiction.)
147
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critically revisited. 148

The Wall Street Journal has looked at how U.K. law gives

shareholders greater direct oversight of managerial action, for example, with respect to
executive compensation.149

The Sarbanes-Oxley legislation, the attempt to shore up U.S. corporate governance
standards, is itself highly controversial both at home and abroad. Roberta Romano refers
to it dismissively as “quack corporate governance”. The great irony, for the bonding
hypothesis, is that there has been no rush by FPIs to signal adherence to these “improved”
corporate governance standards in the United States by flocking to U.S. markets. Rather,
delisting from U.S. exchanges is the new phenomenon, much to the consternation of New
York Stock Exchange officials.150 Canadian issuers though are unlikely to follow the
rest of the FPI pack in the rush to the exits. 151 CBIs are now a permanent, and largely
indistinguishable, feature of the U.S. corporate landscape. The question here, from the

148

Id. “Several authors have criticized [the director rights index] for both its ad hoc nature (which the
creation of our anti-self dealing index is supposed to address) and for several conceptual ambiguities and
outright mistakes in coding.” at 4.
149
’No Excessive Pay, We’re British – U.K. Reins In CEO Compensation as Shareholders Hold More
Sway; Is It a U.S. Model, or Overrated?, WALL ST. J., February 8, 2006 at C1, col. 1.
150

“Companies that choose to list on the NYSE ‘meet the highest standards of any market anywhere’, says
Noreen Culhane, executive vice president in charge of listings at the Big Board. She argues that it lets
them sell their stock for a higher price, and therefore puts a higher value on their company. Companies
tend to list in the market where they believe they [sic] shares will get the best price. In years when the U.S.
market is rallying, New York tends to attract more foreign issuers, she says, because companies feel they
get a better price for their shares when U.S. markets are hot”. Craig Karmin & Aaron Lucchetti, New York
Loses Edge in Snagging Foreign Listings, WALL ST. J., January 26, 2006, at C1.

151

See also SEC Commissioner Paul S. Atkins, Comments at the 4th Annual Financial Services
Conference, available at SEC Website: http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch013106psa.htm. “Our
mission to facilitate capital formation extends not just to companies headquartered in the United States, but
to those from outside the country as well. I was therefore troubled to read … in The Wall Street Journal an
article about a Bombay-listed company, Indiabulls Financial Services, which decided to list its shares on an
overseas stock market but elected not to register in the United States. Their decision reportedly turned on
the excessive time and cost required for a registration in the U.S. compared with listing in jurisdictions in
Europe. They made this decision despite the fact that many of the company's largest investors are U.S.
money managers. If this story actually reflects a rising trend, it is not a welcome one from my
perspective.”
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point of view of U.S. regulators, is whether the large Canadian presence justifies
continued “special status” for CBIs, or on the other hand, militates in favor of “domestic”
treatment (especially if they are seen as masquerading, for purposes of taking advantage
of the home bias effect, as U.S. issuers).

For all FPIs, however, the recent questioning of the “hidden assumption” of the
superiority of U.S. governance mechanisms should lend credence to greater regulatory
deference in the United States to “home country” corporate governance.152 The NYSE,
and to a certain, more limited extent, the SEC, have both implicitly acknowledged
“different but equivalent” non –U.S. corporate governance mechanisms.153 On this
basis, the SEC has given non-U.S. issuers accommodations with respect to compliance
with certain aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley requirements.154 In the glare of considerable
152

Former SEC General Counsel, Ed Greene, and his colleagues at Cleary Gottlieb, have argued for
greater deference on the part of the SEC for over a decade; see Ed Greene, et al Hegemony or
Deference: U.S. Disclosure Requirements in International Capital Markets 50 THE BUSINESS LAWYER 413
(1995).
153
“On the occasion of the visit of EU Internal Markets Commissioner Charlie McCreevy to Washington
DC, SEC Chairman Christopher Cox and Commissioner McCreevy took stock of progress on and affirmed
their commitment to eliminating the need for reconciliation between International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRS) and US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Chairman Cox believes the
use of IFRS has the potential to produce significant benefits for US investors through enhanced
comparability of financial information about investment choices around the world. He congratulates
Commissioner McCreevy on the strides made by the European Union toward implementing IFRS, and
further notes the work accomplished by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), the
independent body charged with establishing high-quality-global accounting standards. Chairman Cox
reaffirms his commitment to the ‘roadmap’ to eliminate, by 2009 at the latest, the SEC requirement for
foreign private issuers to reconcile IFRS-based financial statements to US GAAP.” Press Release, SEC,
Accounting Standards: SEC Chairman Cox and EU Commissioner McCreevy Affirm Commitment to
Elimination of the Need for Reconciliation Requirements (Feb. 8, 2006), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-17.htm. The US SEC reconciliation requirement to US GAAP has
been a long-standing irritant for non-US issuers entering the US market as it necessitates additional costs
and administrative efforts in an already costly exercise. The NYSE has also provided “waivers” of certain
corporate governance requirements for non –U.S. issuers for a number of years. See supra note 14.
154
Audit committees and independence of members, for example. The audit committee requirements of
Sarbanes-Oxley have been some of its most criticized provisions. In response to this, although the
legislation itself makes no distinction between domestic and foreign issuers, the U.S. SEC has issued rules
that create “[t]ailored exemptions and guidance where the requirements of Exchange Act Section 10A(m)
could result in a direct conflict with home country requirements”. See Standards Relating to Listed
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publicity, the SEC also acted very speedily to provide relief for FPIs wishing to delist in
the wake of Sarbanes-Oxley. 155
The bonding hypothesis is not explanatory of the largest and most important segment of
cross-listed foreign issuers in the United States, Canadian issuers. Even more
significantly, perhaps, looking below the surface of the bonding hypothesis reveals the
hidden assumptions about the nature of shareholder rights and investor protection in the
United States.

These assumptions are worth questioning.

Company Audit Committees, 17. C.F.R. 240 (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/338220.htm#>P392-120623.
155
See SEC set to ease rules for foreign groups, FINANCIAL TIMES, December 5, 2005, at 1, col. 2: “Alan
Beller, director of the SEC corporation finance division, told the Financial Times that the commission was
considering the reform because “we do not believe companies should feel trapped in our markets.””
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Appendix 1. Canadian Corporations Listed on the New York Stock Exchange (2004)
Canadian Companies Listed On
NYSE

Original
Date of
Listing

Industry

Issue Type

12/20/1928

Non-ferrous Metals

Common
Stock

5/31/1950

Aluminum

Common
Stock

11/10/1975

Communications
Technology

Common
Stock

8/18/1976

Fixed-line
Communications

Common
Stock

11/13/1980

Furnishings &
Appliances

Common
Stock

5/18/1981

Semiconductors

Common
Stock

5/30/1985

Pipelines

Common
Stock

2/25/1987

Precious Metals

7/1/1987

Paper Products

Common
Stock
Common
Stock

8/13/1987

Precious Metals

Common
Stock

9/22/1987

Paper Products

Common
Stock

11/1/1988

Specialty Retailers

Common
Stock

11/2/1989

Specialty Chemicals

Common
Stock

Inco Ltd. (N)

Alcan Inc. (AL)

Nortel Network Corp. (NT)

BCE Incorparation (BCE)

Moore Wallace Incorporated (MWI)

Zarlink Semiconductor, Inc. (ZL)

TransCanada Corporation (TRP)

Barrick Gold Corp (ABX)

Abitibi-Consolidated, Inc. (ABY)
Placer Dome Inc. (PDG)

Domtar Inc. (DTC)

Intertan Inc. (ITN)

Potash Corporation of
Saskatchewan Inc. (POT)

IPO

X
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ADRs

Magna International Inc. (MGA)
10/9/1992

Auto Parts

Common
Stock

1/20/1993

Precious Metals

Common
Stock

4/2/1993

Building Materials

Common
Stock

10/27/1994

Banks, Ex-s&l

Common
Stock

11/22/1994

Precious Metals

Common
Stock

6/16/1995

Precious Metals

Common
Stock

9/13/1995

Secondary Oil
Companies

Common
Stock

10/16/1995

Banks, Ex-s&l

Common
Stock

11/17/1995

Railroads

Common
Stock

X

12/7/1995

Industrial Services

Common
Stock

X

1/11/1996

Wireless
Communications

Common
Stock

1/11/1996

Broadcasting

Common
Stock

3/14/1996

Mining

Common
Stock

Glamis Gold Ltd. (GLG)

Masonite International Corpoation
(MHM)

Bank of Montreal (BMO)

Agnico-Eagle Mines Limited (AEM)

Goldcorp Inc. (GG)

Petro-Canada (PCZ)

RBC Financial Group (RY)

Canadian National Railway
Company (CNI)

Quebecor World, Inc. (IQW)

Rogers Wireless Communications,
Inc. (RCN)

Rogers Communication Inc. (RG)

Cameco Corporation (CCJ)

X
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Royal Group Technologies Ltd.
(RYG)
4/2/1996

Building Materials

Common
Stock

5/16/1996

Healthcare
Providers

Common
Stock

6/4/1996

Broadcasting

Common
Stock

7/31/1996

Precious Metals

Common
Stock

8/28/1996

Investment
Services

Common
Stock

8/30/1996

Banks, Ex-s&l

Common
Stock

10/4/1996

Specialty Chemicals

Common
Stock

11/15/1996

Oil Drilling,
Equipment &
Services

Common
Stock

12/12/1996

Pharmaceuticals

Common
Stock

12/31/1996

Steel

Common
Stock

2/7/1997

Lodging

Common
Stock

X

3/25/1997

Lodging

Common
Stock

X

4/18/1997

Secondary Oil
Companies

Common
Stock

Extendicare Inc. (EXEA)

CanWest Global Communications
Corporation (CWG)

Meridian Gold Inc. (MDG)

Oppenheimer Holdings Inc. (OPY)

Toronto-Dominion Bank (TD)

Agrium Inc. (AGU)

Precision Drilling Corporation
(PDS)

Biovail Corporation (BVF)

Ipsco Inc. (IPS)

Four Seasons Hotels Inc. (FS)

Intrawest Corporation. (IDR)

Suncor Energy Inc. (SU)

X

X
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Suncor Energy Inc. (SUPRA)
4/18/1997

Secondary Oil
Companies

Structured
Product

10/16/1997

Secondary Oil
Companies

Common
Stock

11/13/1997

Banks, Ex-s&l

Common
Stock

3/10/1998

Industrial Services

Common
Stock

X

6/30/1998

Electric
Components &
Equipment

Common
Stock

X

7/1/1998

Broadcasting

Common
Stock

7/1/1998

Broadcasting

Structured
Product

7/1/1998

Broadcasting

Structured
Product

7/6/1998

Commodity
Chemicals

Common
Stock

7/6/1998

Commodity
Chemicals

Structured
Product

7/6/1998

Commodity
Chemicals

Structured
Product

10/5/1998

Pipelines

Structured
Product

Talisman Energy Inc. (TLM)

Canadian Imperial Bank of
Commerce (BCM)

Ritchie Bros Auctioneers Inc.
(RBA)

Celestica Inc. (CLS)

Shaw Communications Inc. (SJR)

Shaw Communications Inc.
(SJRPRA)

Shaw Communications Inc.
(SJRPRB)

NOVA Chemicals Corporation
(NCX)

NOVA Chemicals Corporation
(NCXPR)

NOVA Chemicals Corporation
(NCXPRA)

TransCanada Pipelines Limited
(TCAPR)
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10/7/1998

Diversified
Technology
Services

Common
Stock

5/28/1999

Investment
Products

Structured
Product

6/2/1999

Real Estate

Common
Stock

8/16/1999

Containers &
Packaging

Common
Stock

9/1/1999

Clothing & Fabrics

Common
Stock

9/23/1999

Auto Parts

Structured
Product

9/24/1999

Life Insurance

Common
Stock

3/23/2000

Life Insurance

Common
Stock

4/7/2000

Advanced Medical
Devices

Common
Stock

5/10/2000

Broadcasting

Common
Stock

7/31/2000

Secondary Oil
Companies

Common
Stock

10/17/2000
11/14/2000

Fixed-line
Communications
Secondary Oil

Common
Stock
Common

CGI Group Inc. (GIB)

The Great-West Life Assurance
Company (GWL)

Brookfield Properties Corporation
(BPO)

Intertape Polymer Group Inc. (ITP)

Gildan Activewear Inc. (GIL)

Magna International Inc.
(MGAPRB)

Manulife Financial Corp. (MFC)

Sun Life Financial, Inc. (SLF)

MDS Inc. (MDZ)

Corus Entertainment, Inc. (CJR)

Canadian Natural Resources, Ltd.
(CNQ)

TELUS Corporation (TU)

X
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Companies

Nexen, Inc. (NXY)

Stock

Enerplus Resources Fund (ERF)
11/17/2000

Fund

Brascan Corporation (BNN)
12/20/2000

Real Estate

Common
Stock

6/27/2001

Non-ferrous Metals

Common
Stock

X

7/11/2001

Property & Casualty
Insurance

Common
Stock

X

7/15/2001

Major Oil
Companies

Structured
Product

7/31/2001

Electric Utilities

Common
Stock

9/15/2001

Specialty Chemicals

Structured
Product

9/15/2001

Mining

Structured
Product

9/27/2001

Investment
Products

Basket

10/3/2001

Railroads

Common
Stock

10/3/2001

Major Oil
Companies

Common
Stock

10/3/2001
10/30/2001

Lodging
Pipelines

Common
Stock
Common

Noranda, Inc. (NRD)

Kingsway Financial Services Inc
(KFS)

EnCana Corporation (ECAPRA)

TransAlta Corporation (TAC)

Agrium Inc. (AGUPR)

Cameco Corporation (CCJPR)

Merrill Lynch Canada Inc. (HCH)

Canadian Pacific Railway Limited
(CP)

EnCana Corporation (ECA)

Fairmont Hotels & Resorts, Inc.
(FHR)
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X

Stock

Enbridge, Inc. (ENB)

Pengrowth Energy Trust (PGH)
4/10/2002

Secondary Oil
Companies

Common
Stock

6/7/2002

Banks, Ex-s&l

Common
Stock

6/12/2002

Publishing

Common
Stock

7/29/2002

Aerospace

Common
Stock

7/30/2002

Soft Drinks

Common
Stock

9/12/2002

Secondary Oil
Companies

Common
Stock

10/11/2002

Oil Drilling,
Equipment &
Services

Common
Stock

11/19/2002

Secondary Oil
Companies

Unit

12/18/2002

Property & Casualty
Insurance

Common
Stock

2/3/2003

Precious Metals

Common
Stock

3/10/2003

Investment
Products

Common
Stock

Real Estate
Secondary Oil
Companies

Common
Stock
Structured
Product

Bank of Nova Scotia (The) (BNS)

The Thomson Corporation (TOC)

CAE Inc. (CGT)

Cott Corporation (COT)

PetroKazakhstan Inc. (PKZ)

CHC Helicopter Corporation (FLI)

PrimeWest Energy Trust (PWI)

Fairfax Financial Holdings Limited
(FFH)

Kinross Gold Corporation (KGC)

Fording Canadian Coal Trust
(FDG)

MI Developments Inc. (MIM)
8/20/2003
Nexen, Inc. (NXYPRB)

11/5/2003

X

X
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Pengrowth Energy Trust (PGH)
Lions Gate Entertainment Corp.
(LGF)

07/15/2004
08/09/2004

Exploration/Product
ion
Broadcasting/Entert
ainment

Gerdav Ameristeel Corp. (GNA)
Kinross Gold Corp. (KGC)

10/15/2004
12/06/2004

Gold Mining
Steel

Unit
Common
Stock
Common
Stock
common

58

Appendix 2. Canadian Companies Listed on the NASDAQ (1980-2003)
Symbol
STKL
NGAS
LMLP
SNDT
CSLMF
COGN
QLTI
MAMA
QSND
ABER
DRAX
DYOLF
BIOM
MEOH
SSPI
LBIX
IDBE
FBAY
HUMC
IMAX
ZICA
CSPLF
WCST
FSRV
CXSN
PAAS
TSMA
BLDP
OTEX
AACB
JCTCF
SSRI
OPMR
MDSI
TESOF
NGPS
ALTI
MXBIF
TLCV
TONS
NYMX
NICK
DECA
DIIB

Company Name

Date Listed

ADRs

TSO

SunOpta, Inc.
Daugherty Resources, Inc.
LML Payment Systems, Inc.
Sand Technology Inc
Consolidated Mercantile Inc
Cognos Incorporated
QLT Inc.
Mamma.com Inc
QSound Labs, Inc.
Aber Diamond Corporation
Draxis Health Inc.
Dynamic Oil & Gas Inc.
Biomira Inc.
Methanex Corporation
Spectrum Signal Processing Inc.
Leading Brands Inc
ID Biomedical Corporation
Frisco Bay Industries Ltd.
Hummingbird Ltd
Imax Corporation
Zi Corporation
Canada Southern Petroleum Ltd.
Wescast Industries Inc.
FirstService Corporation
Counsel Corporation
Pan American Silver Corp.
Tesma International, Inc.
Ballard Power Systems, Inc.
Open Text Corporation

11/17/1981
4/12/1982
6/24/1983
4/15/1985
8/22/1986
7/1/1987
10/25/1988
11/10/1988
1/20/1989
3/20/1989
8/8/1989
10/19/1989
11/19/1991
5/19/1992
6/10/1993
8/2/1993
8/3/1993
10/13/1993
4/25/1994
6/10/1994
6/17/1994
10/20/1994
10/25/1994
1/20/1995
4/24/1995
6/12/1995
7/27/1995
11/8/1995
1/24/1996

52,578,000
9,960,000
19,606,000
13,164,000
4,864,000
89,936,000
68,870,000
6,139,000
7,162,000
54,637,000
37,099,000
20,273,000
53,796,000
119,578,000
14,732,000
14,729,000
36,111,000
2,207,000
18,042,000
39,261,000
38,089,000
14,418,000
5,707,000
13,507,000
48,602,000
43,883,000
18,110,000
115,789,000
40,322,000

Alliance Atlantis Communications, Inc.

1/26/1996

38,923,000

Jewett-Cameron Trading Company
Silver Standard Resources, Inc
Optimal Robotics Corp.
MDSI Mobile Data Solutions, Inc.
Tesco Corporation
NovAtel Inc.
Altair Nanotechnologies Inc.
MFC Bancorp Ltd.
TLC Vision Corporation
Novamerican Steel, Inc.
Nymox Pharmaceutical Corporation
Nicholas Financial, Inc.
Decoma International, Inc.
Dorel Industries, Inc.

4/12/1996
8/1/1996
10/25/1996
11/26/1996
12/2/1996
2/4/1997
3/24/1997
5/14/1997
7/2/1997
10/31/1997
11/28/1997
12/30/1997
2/24/1998
5/8/1998

1,460,000
30,914,000
14,936,000
8,207,000
34,343,000
7,685,000
40,217,000
12,832,000
66,112,000
9,700,000
23,021,000
5,061,000
51,599,000
26,347,000
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TIWI

Telesystem International Wireless Inc.

6/9/1998

93,434,000

MDCA
DECT
ATYT

MDC Partners Inc.
Dectron International, Inc.
ATI Technologies Inc.

10/2/1998
10/6/1998
11/24/1998

16,465,000
2,920,000
244,128,000

DSGX

Descartes Systems Group Inc. (The)

1/27/1999

52,225,000

RIMM
GSLI

Research in Motion Limited
GSI Lumonics Inc.

2/4/1999
3/24/1999

91,720,000
40,891,000

CERI

Capital Environmental Resource, Inc.

6/3/1999

38,445,000

7/29/1999
8/5/1999
12/7/1999
1/28/2000
2/17/2000
3/17/2000
3/21/2000
4/19/2000
5/5/2000
5/10/2000
6/6/2000
6/30/2000
6/30/2000
8/28/2000
10/27/2000
1/10/2001
1/18/2001
3/1/2001
8/9/2001
10/5/2001
4/1/2003
9/3/2003
9/18/2003
11/18/2003
12/17/2003
3/2/2004
5/5/2004
6/7/2004

49,794,000
26,276,000
22,446,000
5,983,000
82,408,000
27,064,000
12,246,000
78,033,000
20,102,000
45,202,000
21,259,000
45,004,000
25,181,000
156,693,000
53,056,000
18,484,000
11,429,000
46,104,000
6,302,000
24,552,000
1,091,000
10,445,000
29,592,000
249,373,000
62,022,000
84,778,000
15,171,000
50,839,0000

CREO
PVTL
WSTM
SVNX
ANPI
FMTI
CRYP
WEDX
SWIR
AELA
ECGI
AXCA
EXFO
IVAN
HYGS
EENC
DMCX
HMSL
IAIA
ONCY
ALLSA
SRXA
NRMX
HUGO
VSGN
GEAC
HMSL
CRME

Creo Inc.
Pivotal Corporation
Workstream Inc.
724 Solutions
Angiotech Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Forbes Medi-Tech Inc.
Cryptologic, Inc.
Westaim Corporation (The)
Sierra Wireless, Inc.
AEterna Laboratories Inc.
Envoy Communications Group, Inc.
Axcan Pharma Inc.
EXFO Electro-Optical Engineering
Ivanhoe Energy, Inc.
Hydrogenics Corporation
Enterra Energy Trust
DataMirror Corporation
Hemosol, Inc.
Intier Automotive Inc.
Oncolytics Biotech, Inc.
Allstream, Inc.
S R Telecom Inc
Neurochem Inc
Ivanhoe Mines Ltd
Vasogen Inc.
GEAC Computer Corporation Ltd.
Hemosol Corp.
Cardiome Pharma Corp.
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Appendix 3. Canadian Companies Filing S-1 (1994-2004)
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Appendix 4. Canadian Companies Filing 10-K (1994-2004)
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Appendix 5. Canadian Companies Filing 20-F (1994-2004)
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Number of Companies

Appendix 6. Canadian Companies Filing 40-F (MJDS) (2002-2004)
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Appendix 7. Canadian Companies Filing 40-F New Registration Forms
(2002-2005)
Company Name

Province

Registration Date

Canadian Superior Energy
Inc.
Pengrowth Energy Trust
Encana Corp.
Vermillion Energy Trust
Stantec Inc.
Norske Skog Canada Ltd.
Northern Orion Resource
Inc.
Hummingbird Ltd.
Novagold Resources Inc.
Ivanhoe Mines Ltd.
Nevsun Resources Ltd.
Cardero Resource Inc.
Formation Capital Corp.
Silver Wheaton Corp.
Gammon Lakes Resources
Inc.
Bank of Nova Scotia
CAE Inc.
Iamgold Corp.
FNX Mining Co. Inc.
Research In Motion Ltd.
Orezone Resources Inc.
Yamana Gold Inc.
Gerdav Ameristeel Inc.
Cinram International Inc.
Banro Corp.
Glencairn Gold Corp.
Trizec Canada Inc.

Alberta

07/16/2002

Alberta
Alberta
Alberta
Alberta
British Columbia
British Columbia

02/22/2002
02/28/2003
07/02/2004
08/03/2005
04/16/2002
12/09/2003

British Columbia
British Columbia
British Columbia
British Columbia
British Columbia
British Columbia
British Columbia
Newfoundland

02/19/2003
10/29/2003
11/17/2003
08/02/2004
11/03/2004
05/27/2005
04/22/2005
07/17/2003

Ontario
Ontario
Ontario
Ontario
Ontario
Ontario
Ontario
Ontario
Ontario
Ontario
Ontario
Ontario

05/03/2002
07/25/2002
11/01/2002
06/04/2003
07/18/2003
11/06/2003
10/31/2003
04/28/2004
05/19/2004
12/30/2004
01/21/2005
04/29/2005
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